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Abstract
We identify a new class of uncountable-compact discounted stochastic games for which
existence of stationary Markov equilibria can be established and we prove two new exis-
tence results for this class. Our approach to proving existence in both cases is new - with
both proofs being based upon continuous approximation methods. For our ?rst result we
use approximation methods involving measurable-selection-valued continuous functions
to establish a new ?xed point result for Nash payo? selection correspondences - and more
generally for measurable-selection-valued correspondences having nonconvex values. For
our second result, we again use approximation methods, but this time involving player
action-pro?le-valued continuous functions to establish a new measurable selection result
for upper Caratheodory Nash payo? correspondences. Because conditions which guar-
antee approximability - the presence of sub-correspondences taking contractible values
(or more generally, ??-values) - are the very conditions which rule out Nash equilibria
homeomorphic to the unit circle, we conjecture that for uncountable-compact discounted
stochastic games, the approximable class is the widest class for which existence of station-
ary Markov equilibria can be established. Key Words: stationary Markov equilibria, dis-
counted stochastic games, ?xed point theorem for nonconvex, measurable-selection-valued
correspondences, Komlos convergence, weak star convergence, sub-USCOs, contractible
values, ??-values, continuous approximation
JEL Classi?cation: C7
1 Introduction
The existence or nonexistence of stationary Markov equilibria for uncountable-compact
discounted stochastic games was an open question from the time of the Himmelberg,
Parthasarathy, Raghavan, and Van Vleck paper on ?-equilibria in stationary strategies in
1976 until 2013.1 Then came the papers of Levy (2013) and Levy and McLennan (2014),
which essentially settled the matter in the negative: uncountable-compact discounted
stochastic games do not always have stationary Markov equilibria. The cause of the
nonexistence problem: Nash equilibria homeomorphic to the unit circle. The purpose
of this paper is to move the boundary of the existence/nonexistence literature in the
positive direction by ?rst identifying a new large class of uncountable-compact discounted
stochastic games for which existence can be established and by then establishing two new
existence results for this class. We call this class of discounted stochastic games (DSGs)
the approximable class.2 The class of approximable DSGs includes supermodular DSGs
and DSGs having weakly interacting players (Amir 1991, Curtat 1996, and Horst 2005),
the new class of DSGs analyzed by Nowak (2003, 2007), the class of risky (or noisy)
DSGs recently studied by Duggan (2012), and the class of all G-nonatomic DSGs recently
studied by He and Sun (2015). Because the condition which guarantees approximability
- the presence of sub-correspondences taking contractible values (or more generally, ??-
values) - is the very condition which rules out Nash equilibria homeomorphic to the
unit circle, we conjecture that for uncountable-compact discounted stochastic games, the
approximable class is the largest class for which existence of stationary Markov equilibria
can be established.
1.1 A Brief Overview of the Literature
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953) who gave the ?rst existence proof of
stationary equilibria for two-person, discounted stochastic games with ?nite state spaces
and ?nite strategy sets. Shapley’s result was then extended to the ?-player case by Fink
(1964) - who allowed for in?nite strategy spaces - and Takahashi (1964). Later other
proofs appeared due to Rogers (1969) and Sobel (1971). These early existence results
were then extended to discounted stochastic games with countably in?nite state spaces
by Parthasarathy (1973), and then by Sobel (1973), but Sobel also extended his results
to games with uncountably many states. This branch of the literature seems to have
culminated in the paper by Federgruen (1978) who pointed out ?aws in the existence
proof of Sobel (1973) for games with uncountable state spaces and who established the
existence of stationary Markov equilibria for discounted stochastic games with countably
in?nite state spaces and compact strategy spaces.
Uncountable-compact discounted stochastic games were ?rst analyzed in the mathe-
matics literature for stationary equilibria by Himmelberg, Parthasarathy, Raghavan, and
Van Vleck (1976) who proved, under separability conditions on state transitions and im-
mediate payo? functions, that such games admit ?-equilibria in stationary strategies.3
Later Parthasarathy (1982) and Nowak (1987) strengthened these ?-equilibria results for
1We will often refer to a ?nite-player, nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game in which players’
strategy sets are compact metric spaces and the state space is uncountable as an uncountable-compact
discounted stochastic game.
2We say that a discounted stochastic game is approximable if the underlying one-shot game either
(i) has an upper Caratheodory Nash equilibrium correspondence whose USCO part can be graphically
approximated by continuous functions (see, for example, Cellina, 1969, and De Blasi and Myjak, 1986) or
(ii) has a Nash payo? selection correspondence (a measurable-selection-valued correspondence) that can
be graphically approximated by continuous, measurable-selection-valued functions.
3A ?-equilibrium in stationary strategies is a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies for ?-almost
every initial state where ? is probability measure ? on the underlying state space.
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separable models to Nash equilibria results. Weakening the separability conditions, Rieder
(1979), Whitt (1980), and Nowak (1985) showed that such games admit ?-Nash equilibria
in stationary Markov strategies. Then, Nowak and Raghavan (1992) and later Du?e,
Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) established that ?-player, uncountable-
compact discounted stochastic games naturally possess correlated stationary Markov equi-
libria, where each such equilibrium is speci?ed by a public randomization device over a set
of ?+1 stationary Markov player strategy ?-tuples. The work by Nowak and Raghavan
(1992) and Du?e, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) made clear the critical
importance of public randomization devices in overcoming the di?cult problems of lack
closedness (in the appropriate topology) and convexity of the Nash payo? selection cor-
respondence in establishing the existence of correlated stationary Markov equilibria for
games with uncountable state spaces and uncountable (but compact) strategy spaces.4
Moreover, the analysis of Nowak and Raghavan (1992) pointed the way to various types
of specializations of the discounted stochastic game model and in particular, led to the
identi?cation of special classes of discounted stochastic game models for which the exis-
tence of stationary Markov equilibria could be established (see Nowak, 2003 and 2007).
Our approach to proving existence - via continuous approximation methods - is new.
In particular, for our ?rst result we use approximation methods involving payo?-selection-
valued continuous functions to establish a new ?xed point result for Nash payo? selection
correspondences - and more generally for measurable-selection-valued correspondences
having nonconvex values. For our second result, we again use approximation meth-
ods, but this time involving player action-pro?le-valued continuous functions to estab-
lish a new measurable selection result (implying our second ?xed point result) for upper
Caratheodory Nash payo? correspondences. Because conditions which guarantee approx-
imability - the presence of sub-correspondences taking contractible values (or more gener-
ally, ??-values) - are the very conditions which rule out Nash equilibria homeomorphic to
the unit circle - we conjecture that for uncountable-compact discounted stochastic games,
the approximable class may be the largest class for which existence of stationary Markov
equilibria can be established. Moreover, we note that with regard to our ?rst approach
(approximation of the Nash payo? selection correspondence by payo?-selection-valued
continuous functions) the su?ciency condition of He and Sun (2015) (i.e., the coarser
transition kernel condition), as well as the su?ciency condition of Duggan (2012) (i.e.,
the presence of a nonatomic noisy states), imply our su?ciency condition (the ?-limit
property - implying approximability) for the existence of stationary Markov equilibria.
Finally, we note that we carry out our analysis within the context a discounted stochas-
tic game model similar to the models used by Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987, 1991),
Nowak and Raghavan (1992), Du?e, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994),
Salon (1998), and Maitra and Sudderth (2007) - as well as the models of He and Sun
(2015) and Duggan (2012).
1.2 An Overview of the Existence Problem
An ?-player discounted stochastic game can be thought of as ? interdependent dis-
counted stochastic dynamic programming problems. As a consequence, Blackwell’s The-
orem (1965) provides the key piece of the puzzle which leads to a solution of the existence
problem in discounted stochastic games by giving necessary and su?cient conditions for
existence in terms of a parameterized collection of state-dependent, one-shot games. Given
state ?, this collection, parameterized by the pro?le of player value functions, ?, is given
4In fact, Forges (1986) was the ?rst to make clear the critical importance of communication and
extensive form correlation devices in resolving existence issues in multistage games.
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by
{G(?? ?)}??L?? :=
©
(??(?)? ??(?? ·? ??))???
ª
??L??
.
Here, ? is a ?nite set of players who in each state ?, choose a feasible action, ??, from a
feasible set of actions, ??(?), so as to maximize their payo? in ?? := [???? ] given by
payo? function
?? ?? ??(?? ??? ???? ??) ? ??,
where ? ? ? is the current state, ?? ? L??? is player ?0? value function and ??? is other
players’ actions.
In choosing actions through discrete time, player ? uses continuation values (or state-
contingent prices) or value function ?? ? L??? to evaluate the future consequences of
current actions. Thus, the collection of one-shot, ?-player games, {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? ,
is a collection of games parameterized by the set of states and value function pro?les or
value function ?-tuples, ? := (??)??? ? L?? , where
? :=
Q
??? and L?? :=
Q
? L??? ?
The basic idea is the following: if in all periods players use valuations ?0 to price the
future consequences of their immediate (current period) choices of a feasible action pro?le,
and if in the current period state ? ? ? prevails, then players will arrive at a pro?le of
immediate actions by playing the one-shot game given by
G(?? ?0) := (??(?)? ??(?? ·? ?0?))??? .
Thus, in state ?, each player, ?, will chose a feasible, immediate action so as to solve the
problem,
max?00? ???(?)
??(?? ?
00
? ? ???? ?0?).
An immediate action pro?le ?? := (???)??? ? ?(?) := ?1(?) × · · · × ??(?) is a Nash
equilibrium for the one-shot game G(?? ?0) if for each player ?,
??(?? ???? ????? ?0?) = max?????(?) ??(?? ??? ????? ?0?).
Throughout the paper we will denote by N (?? ?) the set of all Nash equilibria of the
one-shot game G(?? ?), and by P(?? ?) the corresponding set of Nash payo?s.5 Thus,
? = (??)??? ? P(?? ?) if and only if,
? = (?1(?? ?? ?1)? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??)) for some ? ? N (?? ?).
The question is: which game in the collection is the “correct” game to play? Or equiv-
alently, which value function pro?le should players use in pricing their action choices if
each player wishes to maximize the sum of his discounted future payo?s in equilibrium?
5Also, we will refer to the mapping
(?? ?)? N (?? ?)
as the upper Caratheodory Nash mapping (measurable in ? and upper semicontinuous in ?) with USCO
part,
{N (?? ·) : ? ? ?}?
because for each ?, ? ?? N (?? ?) is upper semicontinuous with nonempty compact values - i.e., ? ??
N (?? ?) is an USCO. Similarly, for the upper Caratheodory Nash payo? mapping,
(?? ?)? P(?? ?)
with USCO part,
{P(?? ·) : ? ? ?}?
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If for each player ? we were to (measurably) string together the single-period, immediate
actions chosen by that player in each possible state ?0 while playing the one shot game,
G(?0? ?), then we would have constructed, for value function pro?le ? := (??)???, a pro?le
of (measurable) functions,
?(·) := (??(·))????
such that for each state ?0, ?(?0) is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game, G(?0? ?).
And if we were to carry out this exercise using the “correct” value functions, ?, then by
Blackwell’s Theorem for dynamic programming extended to stochastic games, we would
have solved our existence problem. Thus, if the primitives of our model are such that we
can always ?nd a Nash equilibrium of our one-shot game for each value function pro?le,
then the problem of proving the existence of stationary Markov equilibria, reduces to
?nding the correct value function pro?le - i.e., the correct prices or the correct continuation
values.
Suppose that under the primitives of our model the one-shot game, G(?? ?), always
has a nonempty set of Nash equilibria, N (?? ?), in all states ? and for all value function
pro?les ?, and therefore, always has a nonempty set of Nash payo?s, P(?? ?). Now observe
that if for a given value function pro?le, ?, the pro?le of real-valued (measurable) payo?
functions, (?(·)?)???, is such that in all states ?,
(???)??? := ?? ? P(?? ?),
then (?(·)?)??? is a pro?le of Nash payo? functions and for this pro?le of state-contingent
payo?s, we can always construct (via implicit measurable selection) a corresponding pro?le
of (measurable) functions ?(·) := (??(·))??? such that given value function pro?le ?,
(??(?))??? ? N (?? ?) for all ?
and
(???)??? = (??(?? ?(?)? ??)??? for all ?.
Thus, given any state ? and any value function pro?le, we can construct, for any pro?le
of state-contingent Nash payo?s, (?(·)?)???, a corresponding pro?le of Nash equilibrium
action choice functions, (??(·))???. Therefore, if we can identify the correct one-shot
game to play - or equivalently - if we can ?nd the correct pro?le of value functions,
then we can ?nd a corresponding pro?le of Nash equilibrium action choice functions -
and by Blackwell’s Theorem (1965), this pro?le of action choice functions will form a
stationary Markov equilibrium strategy for the discounted stochastic game to which our
parameterized collection of one-shot games belongs.
Now we have two key observations: (1) Letting ?(P(·? ?)) denote the collection of
all Nash payo? selection functions given ? ? L?? (i.e., the collection of all measurable
selections, (?(·)?)???, from P(·? ?) given ?), we have
?(P(·? ?)) ? L?? for all ? ? L??
(i.e., all Nash payo? selection pro?les are contained in the space of value function pro?les,
L?? ), and (2) equipping L?? with the appropriate topology (which in this case is the weak
star or ??-topology), we see that in light of observation (1) if we could ?nd a ?xed point
of the Nash payo? selection mapping,
? ?? ?(P(·? ?)),
or equivalently, if we could ?nd a value function pro?le, ??, such that ??(?) ? P(?? ??)
for all ?, then by Blackwell’s Theorem applied to stochastic games, such a ?xed point,
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say ?? ? ?(P(·? ??)), would identify the “correct” one-shot game to play. But therein lies
the problem. The Nash payo? selection mapping is very badly behaved. In particular,
it is, in general, neither convex-valued nor closed-valued with respect to the required ??-
topology.6 The fact that ?(P(·? ?)) lacks convexity is a direct consequence of the fact that,
except in very special case, the underlying Nash mapping, N (·? ·), is not convex valued.7
The fact that ?(P(·? ?)) is not ??-closed valued is direct consequence of the fact that
??-convergence does not in general imply pointwise convergence (i.e., if ?? ??-converges
to ??, then this does not necessarily imply that ??(·) converges to ??(·) pointwise in ??).8
These facts about the Nash payo? selection mapping under the weak star topology
brings us immediately to the usefulness of introducing a public randomization device. In
particular, as shown by Nowak and Raghavan (1992) and by Du?e, Geanakoplos, Mas-
Colell, and McLennan (1994), we can easily extend our discounted stochastic game to
include a public randomization device by simply considering instead the convexi?ed Nash
payo? selection mapping given by
? ?? ?(??P(·? ?)),
where “??” denotes the “convex hull of”. Then, as shown by Nowak and Raghavan, the
convexi?ed Nash payo? selection mapping is ??-upper semicontinuous with nonempty,
convex, and ??-compact values, and thus by the Kakutani-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theo-
rem (Glicksberg, 1952), there exists a ?xed point in valuation pro?les, ?? ? ?(??P(·? ??)).9
6For example, lack of convexity alone immediately rules out the application of the Kakutani-Fan-
Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem (e.g., Glicksberg, 1952) to show that the Nash payo? selection corre-
spondence has ?xed points in stationary strategies - and hence seems to rule out a ?xed point argument
showing the existence of stationary solutions to players’ Bellman equations for the game. Curtat (1996)
and Horst (2005) rely on the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychono? Theorem to ?nd ?xed point in a class of Lip-
schitz continuous strategies. This requires that they show that under their stronger assumptions the
underlying one-shot game has a unique Nash equilibrium for each value function pro?le - hence the rea-
son for their much stronger modeling assumptions - it forces the Nash payo? selection correspondence to
be single-valued and therefore closed and convex-valued. Amir (for example Amir, 1996) instead relies
on Tarski’s Theorem for his ?xed point establishing an equilibrium - hence the reason for Amir’s weaker
modeling assumptions. Here, we will establish two new ?xed point results to show existence.
7This is because, in many games there are multiple Nash equilibria and only in very special cases is
the set of equilibria convex. A quick example illustrates the problem. Consider the two player game,
(??? ??(·))??{1?2}
with ?1 = ?2 = [0? 1] and for ? = 1? 2
??(?1? ?2) = ?1?2 ? (0?1)?2?.
This game has only two Nash equilibria: (0? 0) and (1? 1) - clearly not forming a convex set.
8Consider the measure space (??L? ?) where ? := [0? 1] and ? is Lebesgue measure on [0? 1], and de?ne
the following intervals:
?? :=
?
?=0?2?4?6????[
?
2? ?
(?+1)
2? )
?0? := [0? 1]\???
Each subinterval has the same length, namely, ?([ ?
2? ?
(?+1)
2? )) =
1
2? . Now consider the sequence of
functions ??(·) given by
??(?) :=
3
2
I??(?) +
1
2
(1? I??(?))
where
I??(?) =
?
1 if ? ? ?? :=
?
?=0?2?4?6????[
?
2? ?
(?+1)
2? )
0 otherwise.
This sequence of functions ??-converges to the function ??(?) = 1 for all ? ? [0? 1] - a function not
equal to the pointwise limit of the sequence, {??(·)}?.
9The reason the convexi?ed Nash payo? selection mapping is ??-upper semicontinuous with nonempty,
convex, and ??-compact values is because, while ??-convergence of a subsequence, {???}?, of value func-
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With this ?xed point result in hand, Nowak and Raghavan show - as do Du?e, Geanako-
plos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan - that there exists a correlated stationary Markov equi-
librium, speci?ed by a convexifying, public randomization device over a set of ? + 1
stationary Markov player strategy ?-tuples.
1.3 Summary of Our Results
Given the description of the problem above, we see that the fundamental problem blocking
the proof of existence of stationary Markov equilibria in uncountable-compact discounted
stochastic games is a ?xed point problem (see Theorem 1, our variation on Blackwell’s
Theorem) - caused by the lack of convexity and weak-star closedness (??-closedness) of the
set of measurable selections from the Nash payo? correspondence for the underlying one-
shot game. Here we introduce a two new approaches to the problem based on continuous
approximation.
(1) First Approach: Approximable Nash Payo? Selection Correspondences - K-Class
DSGs
Denoting by
? ?? S?(P?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?]
ª
the Nash payo? selection correspondence, we show that if S?(P(·)) is a
?-correspondence, then it is a ??-??-USCO taking contractible values. In fact, here will
show that if S?(P(·)) is a ?-correspondence (i.e., ??S?(P(·)) contains its ?-limits)
and if the dominating probability measure, ?, is nonatomic, then S?(P(·)) is a
??-??-USCO taking contractible values.10 It then follows from results due to
Gorniewicz, Granas, and Kryszewski (1991) that S?(P(·)) is ??-??-approximable - and
hence has ?xed points. Thus, we show that if S?(P(·)) is a ?-correspondence, then
there exists a value function pro?le, ?? ? L?? , such that
?? ? S?(P??).
Also, we will also show that if the DSG to which S?(P(·)) belongs is noisy or is
G-nonatomic, then S?(P(·)) is automatically a ?-correspondence.
(2) Second Approach: Approximable Nash (Equilibrium) Correspondences -
Approximable DSGs
Denoting the Nash (equilibrium) correspondence by (?? ?) ?? N (?? ?), with USCO part
N???? := {N (?? ·) : ? ? ?}
we show that if for each ?? N???? contains a ??-?-USCO, ?(?? ·), taking contractible
values, then N (·? ·) is approximable, implying that there exists a value function pro?le,
??, such that
??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?].
tion pro?les does not imply pointwise converge of the subsequence, it does imply pointwise convergence
of some sequence of convex combinations of value function pro?les in the subsequence - and this point-
wise convergence of a subsequence of convex combinations of value function pro?les together with the
convexity of the of the mapping,
? ?? ??P(?? ?)
make it possible to show that any weak* limit ?? (as the pointwise limit of some sequence of convex
combinations) is such that
??(?) ? ??P(?? ?) for all ??
10Using methods introduced in Nowak (2003), this conclusion can be shown to hold on any probability
space - nonatomic or not.
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Part I
Discounted Stochastic Games
A non-cooperative ?-player, non-zero sum discounted stochastic game (DSG) is given by
the following primitives:
?
??
???
(?? ??? ?)| {z }
probability space of states
? (??(?)? ??(?? ·? ??))???| {z }
one-shot game, G(???)
? ?(·|·? ·)| {z }
law of motion
?
??
???
? (1)
where player ?0? one-shot payo? function is given by
??(?? ??? ???? ??) := (1? ??)??(?? ??? ???) + ??
Z
?
??(?0)?(?0|?? ??? ???).
2 Primitives and Assumptions
The DSG satis?es the following list of assumptions, labeled [DSG-1]:
(1) ? = the set of players, consisting of ? players indexed by ? = 1? 2? ? ? ? ?? and each
having discount rate given by ?? ? (0? 1);
(2) (?? ??? ?) = the state space where ? is a complete separable metric spaces with
metric ??, equipped with the Borel ?-?eld, ??, upon which is de?ned a probability
measure, ?;
(3) ? := ?1 × · · · ×?? :=
Y
?
?? ? ??, the space of player payo? pro?les,
? := (?1? ? ? ? ? ??), such that for each player ?, ?? := [???? ] and is equipped with the
absolute value metric, ???(??? ?
0
?) := |?? ? ? 0?| and ? :=
Y
?
??, is equipped with the
sum metric, ?? :=
P
? ??? ;
(4) ? := ?1 × · · · ×?? :=
Y
?
?? ? ? :=
Y
?
??, the space of player action pro?les,
? := (?1? ? ? ? ? ??), such that for each player ?, ?? with typical element ?? is a convex,
compact metrizable subset of a locally convex Hausdor? topological vector space ?? and
is equipped with a metric, ??? ? compatible with the locally convex topology inherited
from ??, and ? is equipped with the sum metric, ?? :=
P
? ??? ;
(5) L??? , the Banach space of all ?-equivalence classes of measurable (value) functions,
??(·)? de?ned on ? with values in ?? a.e. [?], equipped with metric ???? compatible with
the weak star topology inherited from L?? ;
(6) L?? := L??1 × · · · × L??? :=
Y
?
L??? ? L??? , the Banach space of all ?-equivalence
classes of measurable (value) function pro?les, ?(·) := (?1(·)? ? ? ? ? ??(·)), de?ned on ?
with values in ? a.e. [?], equipped with the sum metric ??? :=
P
? ???? compatible with
the weak star product topology inherited from
L??? := L?? × · · · × L??| {z }
m times
;
(7) ? ?? ??(?) ? ??, is player ?0? measurable action constraint correspondence,
de?ned on ? taking nonempty ???-closed (and hence compact), convex values in ??;
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(8) ? ?? ?(?) := ?1(?)× · · · ×??(?) :=
Y
?
??(?) ? ?, players’ measurable action
constraint correspondence, de?ned on ? taking nonempty ??-closed (and hence
compact), convex values in ?;
(9) ??(·? ·) : ?×? ?? ? is player ?0? Caratheodory payo? function (i.e., ??(?? ·) is
??-continuous on ? and ??(·? ?) is (??? ??)-measurable on ? for each ?);
(10) ?(·|·? ·) : ?×? ?? ?(?) is the law of motion de?ned on ?×? taking values in the
space of probability measures on ?, having the following properties: (i) ?(·|?? ?) ?? ?
for all (?? ?) ? ?×? (i.e., each probability measure, ?(·|?? ?), is absolutely continuous
with respect to the probability measure, ?), (ii) for each ? ? ??, ?(?|·? ·) is measurable
on ?×?, and (iii) the collection of probability density functions,
?? := {?(·|?? ?) : (?? ?) ? ?×?} ,
of ?(·|?? ?) with respect to ? is such that for each state ?, the function
(??? ???) ?? ?(?0|?? ??? ???)
is continuous in ? and a?ne in ?? a.e. [?] in ?0.
3 The Parameterized Collection of One-Shot Games
We know from Blackwell’s Theorem (1965) - extended to stochastic games - that in
order to ?nd conditions su?cient to guarantee the existence of stationary Markov equilib-
rium, we must focus on the discounted stochastic game’s underlying collection of one-shot
games. This collection of one-shot games is parameterized by states and value func-
tion pro?les. Thus, each value function pro?le, ?, identi?es a particular collection of
state-contingent, one shot ?-games. The crux of the problem is to identify the correct
collection of state-contingent ?-games for players to play - or more speci?cally to identify
the correct value function pro?le, say ??. This problem is a ?xed point problem. Our
main contribution, therefore, will take the form of a ?xed point result for the nonconvex,
measurable-selection-valued Nash payo? selection correspondence. Thus, as a consequence
of Blackwell’s Theorem, our objective will to identify conditions su?cient to guarantee
that the Nash payo? selection correspondence, induced from the Nash payo? correspon-
dence, has ?xed points. We will then be able to deduce, via our ?xed point results, that a
correct collection of state-contingent, one-shot ?-games exists, and via Blackwell’s Theo-
rem, we will be able to conclude that the discounted stochastic game to which this correct
collection of state-contingent ?-games belongs has a stationary Markov equilibrium.
We begin by discussing a ???0? underlying parameterized collection of one-shot
games.
3.1 One-Shot Games
Given discounted stochastic game,
??? :=
©
(?? ??? ?)? (?????(·)? ??(·? ·)? ??)??? ? ?(·|·? ·)
ª
?
with dominating probability measure, ?, and discount rate pro?le, ? := (?1? ? ? ? ? ??), we
have for each state-value function pro?le, (?? ?) ? ?×L?? , a one-shot game given by
G(?? ?) := {??(?)? ??(?? (·? ·)? ??)}??? ,
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where for each action choice pro?le, ? = (??? ???) ? ?, player ?0? expected one-shot payo?
is
??(?? (??? ???)? ??)
:= (1? ??)??(?? (??? ???)) + ??
R
? ??(?
0)?(??0|?? (??? ???))
= (1? ??)??(?? (??? ???)) + ??
R
? ??(?
0)?(?0|?? (??? ???))??(?0)?
Letting
?(?? ?? ?) := (?1(?? ?? ?1)? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??),
under assumptions [DSG-1], we have that in each state, ? ? ?,
(?? ?) ?? ?(?? ?? ?) ? ??
is ??×??-continuous in (?? ?) ? ?×L?? (see the Appendix 1: Mathematical Preliminaries).
A pro?le of action choices, ?? ? ?(?), is a Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game,
G(?? ?), if for each player ?
??(?? (???? ????)? ??) = max?????(?) ??(?? (??? ????)? ??).
Under assumptions [DSG-1] the one-shot game, G(?? ?), always has a nonempty, ??-
compact set of Nash equilibria, N (?? ?), and using Berge’s Maximum Theorem it is
straightforward to show that the Nash correspondence,
N (·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?? (?)
is upper Caratheodory (i.e., N (·? ·) is product measurable in ? and ? and ??-?-upper
semicontinuous in ? with nonempty, ??-compact values). Moreover, it is straightforward
to show that the Nash payo? correspondence,
P(·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?? (?),
given by
P(?? ?) := {? ? ? : ? = ?(?? ?? ?) for some ? ? N (?? ?)} ,
is also upper Caratheodory (i.e., P(·? ·) is product measurable in ? and ? and ??-?-upper
semicontinuous in ? with nonempty, ?? -compact values). Note that the Nash payo?
correspondence, P(·? ·), is the composition of the Caratheodory player payo? functions,
?(·? ·? ·), with the upper Caratheodory Nash correspondence, N (·? ·). Sometimes we will
write P(?? ?) as ?(??N (?? ?)? ?)?
We will denote by
UC??-? := UC(?×L?? ? ?? (?)) and UC??-? := UC(?×L?? ? ?? (?))
the collection of all upper Caratheodory correspondences de?ned on ?×L?? taking values
in ?? (?) and ?? (?) respectively. Thus, under assumptions [DSG-1],
N (·? ·) ? UC??-? and P(·? ·) ? UC??-? ?
3.2 From Action Choices to Strategies
Given a value function pro?le, ? ? L?? , the collection of one-shot games becomes a
collection of state-contingent one-shot games,
? ?? G(?? ?) := {??(?)? ??(?? (·? ·)? ??)}??? ,
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with state contingent Nash correspondence, ? ?? N (?? ?), and state-contingent Nash
payo? correspondence, ? ?? P(?? ?). If we were to measurably string together, state-
by-state, Nash equilibria from each ?-game for a given value function pro?le ?, we would
obtain a pro?le of Nash equilibrium strategies,
? ?? ??(?) := (??1(?)? ? ? ? ? ???(?)).
In particular, given ?, we would have for each ? a Nash equilibrium, ??(?), for the one-
shot ?-game, G(?? ?), in state ?. For each player ?, the (??? ???)-measurable function,
??(·) : ? ?? ??, is player ?0? Nash equilibrium action choice strategy for the collection
of one-shot state-contingent, ?-games, G(?? ?)???. We will denote this fact by writing
??(·) ? ?(N (·? ?)) := ?(N?)?
Note that ??(·) ? ?(N?) is an everywhere (??? ??)-measurable selection of the ?-Nash
correspondence, ? ?? N (?? ?).
3.3 Everywhere Nash Payo? Selections
Let ?(P(·? ?)) := ?(P?) denote the collection of all (??? ??)-measurable selections of
the Nash payo? correspondence, ? ?? P(?? ?). Thus, ?(·) ? ?(P?) if and only if
?(?) ? P(?? ?) for all ?. By the Measurable Implicit Function Theorem (Himmelberg,
1975, Theorem 7.1), for ?(·) ? ?(P?), there exists ??(·) ? ?(N?) such that ?(?) =
?(?? ??(?)? ?) for all ? and ?(·? ??(·)? ?) ? ?(P?). Conversely, if ??(·) ? ?(N?), then
?(·? ??(·)? ?) ? ?(P?).
3.4 Payo?s and Probabilities under Stationary Markov Strategies
A stationary Markov strategy for player ?, is a (??? ???)-measurable function, ??(·) :
? ?? ??, such that ??(?) ? ??(?) for all ?. Thus, the collection of all player ? station-
ary Markov strategies is given by ?(??), the collection of all (everywhere) measurable
selections of ??(·).11 A Markov strategy pro?le is given by,
(?1(·)? ? ? ? ? ??(·)) ? ?(?),
where
?(?) :=
Y
???
?(??)
is the collection of all such pro?les.
Let
??? (?(·))(?) :=
?
?
?
??(?? ?(?)) for ? = 1R
? ??(?
0? ?(?0))???1(?0|?? ?(?)) for ? ? 2?
(2)
denote the ??? period expected payo? to player ? under Markov strategy pro?le ?(·)
starting at state ? given law of motion ?(·|·? ·). Here, for ? ? 2, ??(·|?? ?(?)) is de?ned
recursively by
??(?|?? ?(?))
=
R
? ?(?|?0? ?(?0))???1(?0|?? ?(?))?
?
?
? (3)
11Thus, ??(·) ? ?(??) if and only if
??(·) : ? ?? ?
is (??? ???)-measurable and ??(?) ? ??(?) for all ?. Such a strategy is stationary because it does not
depend on time (the same strategy applies at all time points). Such a strategy is Markov because the
action choice speci?ed by the strategy in a function of the current state - and nothing else.
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The discounted expected payo? to player ?, with discount rate ?? ? [0? 1), over an in?nite
time horizon under Markov strategy pro?le ?(·) starting at state ? is given by
???? (?(·))(?) :=
P?
?=1 ?
??1
? ???? (?(·))(?)? (4)
A stationary Markov strategy pro?le ??(·) ? ?(?) is a stationary Markov equilibrium
if for all players ? and in all states ?,
???? (???(·)? ????(·))(?) ? ???? (?0?(·)? ????(·))(?)?
for all other strategies, ?0?(·) ? ?(??).
3.5 Other Continuity Properties
In the underlying one-shot game, each player’s expected payo? function, ??(·? ·? ·) for
? = 1? 2? ? ? ? ??, is given by,
??(?? ?? ??) :=
Z
?
[(1? ??)??(?? ?) + ????(?0)?(?0|?? ?)]| {z }
??(??????(?0))
??(?0). (5)
Let
?(?? ?? ?) := (?1(?? ?? ?1)? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??)
and
?(?? ?? ?(?0)) := (?1(?? ?? ?1(?0))? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??(?0)).
(1) By part (iii) of assumption (6) we have via Sche?ee’s Theorem (see Billingsley,
1986, Theorem 16.11) that
sup??B(?) |?(?|?? ??)? ?(?|?? ??)|?
?
R
? |?(?0|?? ??)? ?(?0|?? ??)|? ??(?0) ?? 0?
?
?
? (6)
for any sequence of action pro?les {??}? in?(?) converging to ?? ? ?(?). Thus, ?? ???? ?
?
implies that
sup??B(?) |?(?|?? ??)? ?(?|?? ??)|? ?? 0?
sometimes written k?(·|?? ??))? ?(·|?? ??)k? ?? 0?
(2) As noted above, under assumptions (5) and (6), in each state, ? ? ?, each player’s
expected payo? function, (?? ??) ?? ??(?? ?? ??) ? ??, is ??×??? -continuous in (?? ??) ?
?×L??? - so that in each state, ? ? ?, the ?-valued function,
(?? ?) ?? ?(?? ?? ?) ? ??
is ??×??-continuous in (?? ?) ? ?×L?? . In fact, we can say more about the collection of
functions, ?(?? ·? ?) : ? ?? ?, for (?? ?) ? ?× L?? . In particular, as has been shown by
Salon (1998) that for each state ? ? ? the collection of functions,
{?(?? ·? ?) : ? ? L?? } ,
is uniformly equicontinuous on ?(?).12 To see this, let
????(·) := (1? ??)??(?? ·) + ??
R
? ??(?
0)?(?0|?? ·))??(?0)?
12The collection,
?
?(?? ·? ?) : ? ? L??
?
, is uniformly equicontinuous if for any ? ? 0 there is a ? ? 0
such that for any ? and ?0 in ?(?) with ??(?? ?0) ? ?,
??(?(?? ?? ?)? ?(?? ?0? ?)) ? ?,
for all ? ? L?? .
11
For ?xed ?, we have for each ? ? L??
|????(?)? ????(?0)|
? (1? ??) |??(?? ?)? ??(?? ?0)|
+???
¯¯R
? ?(?
0|?? ?)??(?0)? R? ?(?0|?? ?0)??(?0)¯¯ ?
Because
??(?? ·) and ??(?) :=
Z
?
?(?0|?? ·)??(?0)
are continuous functions on a compact set, and hence uniformly continuous, for any ?2 ? 0
there is a ? ? 0 such that for any ? and ?0 in ?(?) with ??(?? ?0) ? ?
|??(?? ?)? ??(?? ?0))| ? ?2
and
|??(?)???(?0)| ? ?2 .
3.6 Nash Payo? Selections
3.6.1 The De?nition
A Nash payo? selection is a function, ?(·) ? L?? such that ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?] for some
?xed value function pro?le, ? ? L?? . Given parameterized games, {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? ,
satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] with Nash payo? correspondence, P(·? ·) ? UC??-? , the
induced Nash payo? selection correspondence is given by
? ?? ??(P?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?]
ª
.
Thus, for each value function pro?le ?, S?(P?) is the set of all ?-equivalence classes of
measurable selections of the measurable correspondence,
? ?? P?(?) := P(?? ?),
Recall that ??(P?) denotes the prequotient of ??(P?) while ?(P?) denotes the set of
all everywhere measurable selections of P?(·) (for a given ?).13 Because the Nash payo?
correspondence, ? ?? P?(?), is (??? ??)-measurable with nonempty compact values in
?, by the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (1965), P?(·) has (??? ??)-
measurable selections (i.e., ??(P?) 6= ?).
3.6.2 Decomposability
In general, a subset S of L?? is said to be decomposable if for any two functions ?0(·) and
?1(·) in S and for any ? ? ??, we have
?0(·)??(·) + ?1(·)??\?(·) ? S.
For the Nash payo? correspondence, P(·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?? (?), an upper Caratheodory
correspondence, for each ? ? L?? , the induced Nash payo? selection correspondence,
S?(P(·)), takes decomposable values. Moreover, for each ?, S?(??) is k·k1-closed (or
L1??-closed) in L??? . Thus, for any sequence {??(·)}? in S?(P?) converging in L1??-norm
13A (??? ??)-measurable function, ?(·), is an everywhere measurable selection of P?(·) provided ?? ?
P?(?) for all ? ? ?.
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to ?0(·) ? L??? , we have ?0(·) ? S?(P?). We will denote by ??1S?(P?) the L1??-closure of
S?(P?) in L??? . By Lemma 1 in Pales and Zeidan (1999), we know that, in addition to
S?(P?) being decomposable, S?(P?) is L1??-closed in L??? . Thus, we have
??1S?(P?) = S?(P?).
We also know by Corollary 1 in Pales and Zeidan (1999) that
??1S?(P?) =
n
?(·) ? L??? : ? {??(·)}? ? S?(P?) such that lim?
°°°??(·) ? ?(·)°°°
1
= 0
o
.
Finally, note that L?? too is decomposable and L1??-closed in L??? .
3.6.3 Sequences of Nash Payo? Selections and Sequences of Nash Equilibria
Consider a sequence, n
(??? ??(·)
o
?
? ????(P(·)) ? L?? ×L?? ,
where for each ?, ??(·) ? L?? is a Nash payo? selection, that is,
??? ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?].
Let ?? be the exceptional set (i.e., the set of ?-measure zero) such for ? ? ?\??,
??? ? P(?? ??) for all ?.
For each ?, we have by the Measurable Implicit Function Theorem (e.g., Himmelberg,
1975, Theorem 7.1) a (??? ??)-measurable function, ??(·) : ? ?? ?, such that for each
? and ? ? ?\??, ??(?) ? N (?? ??). Thus, we have for each ? and ? ? ?\??,
??? = ?(?? ??(?)? ??) for all ? ? ?\??, (7)
where
?(?? ??(?)? ??) := (?1(?? ??(?)? ??1 )? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ??(?)? ???))?
Note that under assumptions [DSG-1], the sequence {??(·)}? ? L1?? is k·k1-bounded.
3.7 Selections from the Graph of the Nash Payo? Correspondence
3.7.1 The De?nition
A measurable selection from the graph of the Nash payo? correspondence,
? ?? ??P?(·) := {(?? ?) ? L?? ×? : ? ? P(?? ?)} ?
is a function, ? ?? (??? ??) ? L?? ×?, such that ?? ? P(?? ??) for all ?. By Lemma
3.1(ii) in Kucia and Nowak (2000), the Nash payo? graph correspondence, ??P(·)(·),
is (??? ??? × ??)-measurable with nonempty compact values in L?? × ?, and by the
Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (1965), the Nash payo? graph correspon-
dence, ??P(·)(·), has (??? ??? × ??)-measurable selections (i.e., ?(??P(·)(·)) 6= ?, so
that S?(??P(·)(·)) 6= ?). Thus, there exists at least one measurable function,
? ?? (??? ??) ? L?? ×?
such that
?? ? P(?? ??) for all ?.14
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3.7.2 Sequences of Payo? Graph Selections and Sequences of Nash Equilibria
Consider a sequence,
n
(??(·)? ??(·)
o
?
? ?(??P(·)(·)), of selections of the Nash payo? graph
correspondence. For each ?,
??? ? P(?? ???) for all ?,
and therefore, for each ?, we have by the Measurable Implicit Function Theorem (e.g.,
Himmelberg, 1975, Theorem 7.1) a (??? ??)-measurable function, ??(·) : ? ?? ?, such
that for each ?, ??(?) ? N (?? ???) for all ? with
??? = ?(?? ??(?)? ???) for all ?, (8)
where
?(?? ??(?)? ???) := (?1(?? ??(?)? ???1)? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ??(?)? ????))?
3.8 The Problem
It follows from Blackwell’s Theorem (1965) that a stationary Markov strategy pro?le,
??(·) := (??1(·)? ? ? ? ? ???(·)) ? ?(N??)?
is a Nash equilibrium of a discounted stochastic game if and only if there exists a pro?le
of continuation values (or value functions), ?? := (??1 ? ? ? ? ? ???) ? L?? such that ??(?) ?
P(?? ??) for all ?, i.e., such that,
??(·) := (??1(·)? ? ? ? ? ???(·)) ? ?(P??)?
and such that together the pair, (??(·)? ??(·)) ? ?(N??)×?(P??). Equivalently, ??(·) is a
stationary Markov equilibrium if and only if the pair, (??(·)? ??(·)), satisfy the following
system of equations:
for players ? = 1? 2? ? ? ? ?? and for all initial states ?
???(?) = (1? ??)??(?? ??(?)) + ??
Z
?
???(?0)?(?0|?? ??(?))??(?0)| {z }
??(????(?)????)
(9)
and
??(?? ???(?)? ????(?)? ???) = max????(?) ??(?? ?? ????(?)? ???). (10)
Thus, if for the given strategy pro?le, ??(·), ??(·), satis?es state-by-state for each player ?
the Bellman equations (9), and if for the given value function pro?le, ??(·), ??(·), satis?es
state-by-state for each player ? the Nash conditions (10), then together, (??(·)? ??(·)),
satisfy Blackwell’s conditions, and by Blackwell’s Theorem, ??(·) is a stationary Markov
equilibrium of the discounted stochastic game with underlying state-contingent, collection
of one-shot games, {G(?? ??)}???.
Note that if (?? ?) ?? N (?? ?) is the Nash equilibria correspondence for the one-shot
game, (?? ?) ?? G(?? ?), and if (?? ?) ?? P(?? ?) is the induced Nash equilibria payo?
correspondence given by
P(?? ?) := {? ? ? : ?? = ??(?? ?? ??)?? and some ? ? N (?? ?)}
then by Blackwell’s Theorem (1965) the discounted stochastic game with underlying col-
lection of one-shot games,
G(?? ?)(???)??×L?? ?
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has a stationary Markov equilibrium if and only if there is a value function pro?le, ??,
such that
??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?],
or equivalently, if and only if there is a value function pro?le, ??, such that
?? ? S?(P(·? ??)),
where for each ?, S?(P(·? ?)) is the set of ?-equivalence classes of measurable selections
of the Nash payo? correspondence, ? ?? P(?? ?). Once we have found a ?xed point,
?? ? S?(P??) := S?(P(·? ??))?
or equivalently a solution to the Bellman inclusion and in particular, a ?? ? L?? such that
??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?],
we can easily deduce the existence of an everywhere measurable selection ?? ? ?(P(·? ??))
such that ?? = ?? a.e. [?] and from this we can easily deduce the existence of the strat-
egy pro?le, ??(·), such that ??(·) ? ?(N (·? ??)) using the Measurable Implicit Function
Theorem (e.g., Himmelberg, 1975, Theorem 7.1). Thus, in order to establish the exis-
tence of a stationary Markov equilibrium for our discounted stochastic game it follows
from Blackwell’s Theorem (1965) that it is both necessary and su?cient that there ex-
ists a ?xed point, ??, of the corresponding the Nash payo? selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P(·? ?)) or equivalently, that the Bellman inclusion have a solution. Formally,
we have the following variation on Blackwell’s Theorem (1965):
Theorem 1 (Necessary and su?cient conditions for the existence of stationary Markov
equilibria):
Let
??? :=
©
(?? ??? ?)? (?????(·)? ??(·? ·)? ??)??? ? ?(·|·? ·)
ª
?
be a discounted stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1], with Nash payo?
correspondence, P(·? ·), for the underlying one-shot game. Then DSG has a stationary
Markov equilibrium if and only if the Nash payo? selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P(·? ?)),
has a ?xed point.
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Part II
The Fixed Point Problem for Nash
Payo? Selection Correspondences
As a consequence of Theorem 1 above, the ?rst solution we will present for the problem
of existence of stationary Markov equilibria in discounted stochastic games will take the
form of a new ?xed point theorem for the nonconvex, measurable-selection-valued Nash
payo? selection correspondence.
Consider the measurable-selection-valued correspondence,
? ?? S?(P(·? ?)) := ©?(·) ? L?? : ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?]ª ?
induced by an upper Caratheodory correspondence,
(?? ?) ?? P(?? ?) := {? ? ? : ? = ?(?? ?? ?) for some ? ? N (?? ?)} ?
gotten by composing the continuous function, ?(?? ·? ?) : ? ?? ?, with the upper
Caratheodory correspondence, N (·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ???? (?). Here, ???? (?) is the collec-
tion of all nonempty, ??-closed subsets of ?. We will sometimes denote this composition
by
(?? ?) ?? ?(??N (?? ?)? ?).
We will use the notations ? ?? S?(P(·? ?)), ? ?? S?(P?), and S?(P(·)) to de-
note our measurable-selection-valued correspondence. In general, the induced measurable
selection valued correspondence, S?(P(·)), of an upper Caratheodory correspondence,
P(·? ·), while nonempty valued is neither convex-valued nor closed-valued in the weak star
topology - and these facts make the ?xed point problem for such correspondences di?cult.
4 Approximable Nash Payo? Selection Correspondences
De?nition 1 (Approximable Nash Payo? Selection Correspondences)
S?(P(·)) is ??-??-approximable if for each ? ? 0, there exists a ??-??-continuous
function,
??(·) : L?? ?? L?? ?
such that for each (?? ?(·)) ? ???? ? L?? ×L?? (i.e., for each (?? ?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? , with
?(·) = ??(?) ? L?? ) there exists
(?? ? (·)) ? ??S?(P(·)) ? L?? ×L??
(i.e., there exists ? (·) ? S?(P?)) such that
???(?? ?) + ???(?(·)? ? (·)) ? ?. (11)
Equivalently, for any ? ? 0
???? ? ???×??(????S?(P(·))).
Thus, the graph of the continuous function ?? : L?? ?? L?? is contained in the ???×??-
open ball of radius ? about the graph of S?(P(·)).
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5 DSGs with Nash Payo? Selection Correspondences
that are ?-Correspondence
We begin by de?ning what we mean by a ?-correspondence.
De?nition 2 (? Correspondences)
Consider the Nash payo? correspondence given by
P(?? ?) := ?(??N (?? ?)? ?),
where the upper Caratheodory Nash correspondence, N (·? ·), and the ?-valued
Caratheodory players’ payo? function, ?(·? ·? ·), satisfy the relevant assumptions in list,
[DSG-1]. Consider the induced Nash payo? selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P?).
We say that S?(P(·)) is a ? correspondence (or has the ?-limit Property) if for any
?-converging sequence,
{(??? ??(·))}? ? ??S?(P(·)) ? L?? ×L?? ,
with ?-limit (b?? b?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? ,
b?(·) ? S?(P?).
By Page’s (1991) lower closure result for ?-limits (Proposition 1 in Page, 1991), we
know that b?? ? ????{???} a.e. [?]. (12)
This fact will be very useful in connecting our results on stationary Markov equilibria to
recent results by Duggan (2012) and He and Sun (2015).
5.1 G-Nonatomic Discounted Stochastic Games
In this subsection we will de?ne the notion of G-nonatomic DSGs and we will show
that all G-nonatomic DSGs have Nash payo? selection correspondences that are ?-
correspondences. This conclusion rests upon a measure theoretic condition introduced
by Rokhlin (1949) and Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) ensuring the existence of a convex
set of conditional selections of a measurable, closed valued correspondence. We will call
this condition the G-nonatomic condition.
The G-nonatomic condition led He and Sun (2015) to study the class of DSGs which
we will call here, the G-nonatomic class. In this subsection, using (12) and Dynkin and
Evstigneev (1976) we will show that all G-nonatomic DSGs are ?-class (i.e., G-nonatomic
DSGs are a sub-class of DSGs with the ?-limit property). He and Sun (2013) call the
class of G-nonatomic DSGs, games with a coarser transition kernels. Whatever its name,
the usefulness of the G-nonatomic class in establishing the existence of stationary Markov
equilibria follows from the extension of Lyapunov’s Theorem (1940) due to Dynkin and
Evstigneev (1976). In what we do here, we go back to the de?nitions and results of
Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) - rather than He and Sun (2015). Recall that here we have
assumed that the state space is a Polish space, ?? equipped with the Borel ?-?eld, ??,
and a probability measure, ?, de?ned on ??. Also, recall that when ? is Polish, ? is
nonatomic if and only if ?({?}) = 0 for all ? ? ? (see Hildenbrand, 1974). Suppose now
that G is a sub-?-?eld of ??. Denote by ?G(·) a regular G-conditional probability given
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sub-?-?eld G. Following Dynkin and Evstigneev, ? ? ?? is G-atom if ?(?) ? 0 and for
any ? ? ?? such that ? ? ?
?
©
? ? ? : 0 ? ?G(?)(?) ? ?G(?)(?)
ª
= 0.
Let ? : ? ?? ?? (?) be an arbitrary measurable correspondence taking nonempty,
closed values in ?. We will denote by
S?G (?) := {?(? |G) ? L?? (G) : ? ? S?(?)}
the collection of all ?-equivalence classes of regular G-conditional expectations of ?-
essentially bounded a.e. measurable selections of ?. The following extension of Lyapunov’s
Theorem is due to Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976).
Theorem 2 (An extension of Lyapunov’s Convexity Theorem)
Let ? : ? ?? ?? (?) be a measurable correspondence taking nonempty, closed values in
?. If for some sub-?-?eld, G, of ??, ?? contains no G-atoms, then
S?G (?) = S?G (???),
where ?? denotes the convex hull.
He and Sun (2015) give a slightly di?erent de?nition of G-atoms - one implied by
Dynkin and Evstigneev’s de?nition - and they show that if the state space underlying the
game is nonatomic and has no G-atoms, then the the discounted stochastic game has a
stationary Markov equilibrium. Our next result, Theorem 3, shows that our condition,
the ?-limit property, is implied by the absence of G-atoms.
Theorem 3 (All G-nonatomic ???? are ?-class nonatomic ????)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game, ???, satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] and having a Nash payo?
selection correspondence, S?(P(·)). If the underlying probability space, (?? ??? ?), is
such that for some sub-?-?eld, G, of ??, ?? contains no G-atoms, then S?G (P(·)) has
the ?-limit property, and in fact, is a convex-valued, ??-??-sub-USCO of S?(P(·)).
PROOF: Let {(??? ??(·))}? be any sequence contained in??(S?(P(·))) such that ?? ????
?? ? L?? . We have for each ?, ??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?]. By the ? compactness of
L?? , we can assume WLOG that the sequence, {(??? ??(·))}?, ? converges with ? limit
(b?? b?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? . We have
b??(?) := 1?
?X
?=1
??(?) ?? b?(?) a.e. [?],
and by the properties of conditional expectations (see Ash, 1972),
?(b??|G)(?) := 1?
?X
?=1
?(??|G)(?) ?? ?(b? |G)(?) a.e. [?].
By Proposition 1 in Page (1991) - i.e., by Page’s lower closure result,
?(b? |G)(?) ? ????{?(??|G)(?)} a.e. [?].
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By Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976),
????{?(??|G)(?)} = ??{?(??|G)(?)} a.e. [?].
and by the properties of conditional expectations, ????{?(??|G)(·)} ? S?G (P??). Thus,
?(b? |G)(?) ? ??{?(??|G)(?)} a.e. [?],
i.e., S?G (P(·)) has the ?-limit property. In fact, S?G (P(·)) is a convex-valued, and by
Theorem A2.3 is a ??-??-sub-USCO of S?(P(·)). Q.E.D.
5.2 Noisy Discounted Stochastic Games
Another interesting sub-class of discounted stochastic games is the class of noisy DSGs
recently studied by Duggan (2012). By specializing primitives and assumptions of our
discounted stochastic game model above, we can easily make our model a noisy stochastic
game model. We need only modify assumptions (2) and (10) as follows:
In a noisy DSG (i.e., NDSG) the state space is given by ? := ?×? with typical element
? := (?? ?), where both ? and ? are complete separable metric spaces with metrics ?? and
?? , equipped with the Borel ?-?elds ?? and ?? . By structuring the state space in this
way, we can analyze situations where part of the riskiness is controllable (in a stochastic
sense) and part of the riskiness is only indirectly controllable or not controllable at all. In
particular, we can think of ? ? ? as being the stochastically controllable regular state, and
we can think of ? ? ? as being the indirectly stochastically controllable (or uncontrollable)
noisy state.
In an NDSG, the law of motion
((?? ?)|{z}
?
? ?) ?? ?(·|(?? ?)|{z}
?
? ?)
is given by
?(?(?0? ?0)|(?? ?)? ?) := ?(??0|?0)?(??0|(?? ?)? ?)?
or
?(?(?0? ?0)|?? ?) := ?(??0|?0)?(??0|?? ?)?
where ? = (?? ?) denotes the current state and ?0 = (?0? ?0) denotes the coming state - and
depending on the regular state ?0 chosen by the probability measure, ?(??0|?? ?), in current
state ? = (?? ?) given action pro?le ? ? ?(?), the noisy state ?0 will be chosen according
to the probability measure, ?(??0|?0). Thus, while regular states are directly stochastically
controllable via the stochastic kernel, ?(??0|?? ?), noisy states are only indirectly stochas-
tically controllable via ?(??0|?0). In this sense, we say that the discounted stochastic game
is noisy.
To complete our formal description of the noisy discounted stochastic game model,
assume that for all ?0 ? ? , the probability measure, ?(??0|?0), governing the choice of
the coming noisy state ?0 is absolutely continuous with respect to a probability measure,
?(??0), de?ned on the measurable space, (????), of noisy states.15 Also, assume that for
all (?? ?) ? ? × ?(?), the probability measure, ?(??0|?? ?), governing the choice of the
coming regular state ?0, given current state, ? := (?? ?) and action pro?le ? ? ?(?), is
absolutely continuous with respect to a probability measure, ?(??0), de?ned on the mea-
surable space, (???? ), of regular states. Thus, the noisy DSG has dominating probability
15Duggan assumes that the dominating probability measure, ?, is nonatomic - but we will show that
this is not required for existence of stationary Markov equilibria.
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measure given by the product measure, ? := ? × ?? By the Corollary in Rao and Rao
(1972), if ? is nonatomic, then ? is nonatomic.16
Let
?? := {?(??|?? ?) : (?? ?) ? ?×?} ,
be the collection of probability density functions of ?(·|?? ?) with respect to ? such that
for each state ? := (?? ?), the function
(??? ???) ?? ?(?0|(?? ?)? ??? ???)
is continuous in ? and a?ne in ?? a.e. [?] in ?0. Also, let
?? := {?(??0|?0) : ?0 ? ?} ,
be the collection of probability density functions of ?(·|?0) with respect to ? such that the
function
?0 ?? ?(?0|?0)
is measurable in ?0 a.e. [?] in ?0.
Specializing (2) and (10) in our list of assumptions, [DSG-1], above, label the new list
of assumptions [NSG-1].
The key result connecting Duggan’s noisy DSGs to our ?-class DSGs is due to He
and Sun (2015).
Theorem 4 (All Noisy ???? Are G-Nonatomic)
If {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? is the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game, ???, satisfying assumptions [NSG-1](i.e., if ??? is noisy), then
??? is G-nonatomic.
Thus, by Theorems 3 and 4 we have,
{all noisy ????} ? {all G-nonatomic ????} ? {all ?-class ????}?
He and Sun (2013) were the ?rst to investigate G-nonatomic discounted stochastic
games - only they used a weaker version of the Dynkin-Evstigneev-Rokhlin condition.
They called their condition - implied by the Dynkin-Evstigneev-Rokhlin condition - the
coarser transition kernel condition. Both G-nonatomic discounted stochastic games, as
well as discounted stochastic games with coarser transition kernel are examples of ?-class
discounted stochastic games. The key ingredient allowing the G-nonatomic condition as
well as the coarser transition kernel condition to deliver an existence result for stationary
Markov equilibria is the extension of Lyapunov’s Theorem (1940) due to Dynkin and
Evstigneev (1976). In what we did here, we went back to the de?nitions and results of
Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) - rather than He and Sun (2015).17
16??? is an atom of ? relative to ?(·) if the following implication holds: if ?(?) ? 0, then ? ? ?
implies that ?(?) = 0 or ?(???) = 0. If ? contains no atoms relative to ?(·), ? is said to be atomless
or nonatomic. Because ?? is a complete, separable metric space ?(·) is atomless (or nonatomic) if and
only if ?({?}) = 0 for all ? ? ? (see Hildenbrand, 1974, pp 44-45).
17He and Sun (2015) give a slightly di?erent de?nition of G-atoms - one implied by Dynkin and
Evstigneev’s de?nition - and they show that if the state space underlying the game is nonatomic and
has no G-atoms, then the the discounted stochastic game has a stationary Markov equilibrium.
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6 ?-Class DSGs and the Fixed Point Problem
Recall that the Nash payo? selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P(·? ?)) := S?(?(·?N (·? ?)? ?))?
for the parameterized game,
G(?? ?)(???)??×L?? :=
¡{??(?)? ??(?? (·? ·)? ??)}???¢(???)??×L?? ?
underlying a discounted stochastic game - in most cases - has very undesirable proper-
ties. However, in this subsection, we will show that, in fact, if the Nash payo? selection
correspondence, S?(P(·)), is a ?-correspondence, then S?(P(·)) is an approximable, ??-
??-USCO - and therefore, a correspondence having ?xed points.
6.1 All Nonatomic ?-Class DSGs have Approximable Nash Pay-
o? Selection Correspondences
We will show that if the Nash payo? selection correspondence, S?(P(·)), belonging to
a DSG is a ?-correspondence, then it is a ??-?-USCO. Moreover, we show that if the
dominating probability measure, ?, is nonatomic, then S?(P(·)) takes contractible val-
ues (with respect to the ?? topology). Thus, if the DSG is noisy and the dominating
probability measure for the noisy state, ?, is nonatomic, then S?(P(·)) is a ??-??-USCO
taking contractible values.
Theorem 5 (If S?(P(·)) has the ?-limit property and ? is nonatomic, then S?(P(·))
is a ??-??-USCO taking contractible values)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1]. If the Nash payo? selection
correspondence, S?(P(·)), is a ?-correspondence (i.e., has the ?-limit property), then
the following statements are true:
(1) S?(P(·)) is a ??-??-USCO, that is, S?(P(·)) ? U??-?? .
(2) If the dominating probability measure, ?, is nonatomic, then for each ? ? L?? ,
S?(P?) is contractible (with respect to the ??topology).
PROOF: (1) Because S?(P(·)) has the ?-limit property, it follows from Komlos The-
orem and Theorem A2.1(1) that for each ? ? L?? , S?(P?) is ??-compact. Therefore,
to show that S?(P(·)) ? U??-?? , it su?ces to show that ??S?(P(·)) is ???×??-closed in
L?? ×L?? . Let {(??? ??(·))}? be any sequence in ??S?(P(·)) such that
?? ??
?
b? and ??(·) ??? b?(·).
Thus, {(??? ??(·))}? is a sequence of payo? selections (rather than a sequence of payo?
graph selections). By Theorem A2.1(1), we have ?? ??
??
?? and ??(·) ???? ?
?
(·) with ?? = b?
and b?(·) = ??(·) a.e. [?]. Also, we have for each ?,
??? ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?].
By the ?-limit property of S?(P(·)), we have that
b?(·) ? S?(P?),
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and given that b?(·) = ??(·) a.e. [?], we have
??(·) ? S?(P?).
Given that ?? = b? a.e. [?], we have P(?? ??) = P(?? b?) a.e. [?]. Thus, ??(·) ? S?(P??)
(i.e., implying that (??? ??(·)) ? ??S?(P(·)).
(2) Next, for S?(P(·)) ? U??-?? , we will show that if the dominating probability
measure, ?, is nonatomic, then for each ?, S?(P?) is contractible.
First, if the dominating probability measure, ?, is nonatomic, then as shown by
Fryszkowski (1983), Liapunov’s Theorem (1940) on the range of a vector measure guar-
antees the existence of a family of measurable sets, {??}??[0?1], such that
?0 ? ?? ??0 ? ??, ?0 = ? and ?1 = ?, and
?(??) = ??(?) = ?.
¾
(13)
Using the properties of this system of measurable sets and the decomposability of S?(P?)
for each ? ? L?? , we will show that for each ? the function ??(·? ·) given by
??(?? ?) := ?1(·)???(·) + ?(·)??\??(·) ? ?(?) for all (?? ?) ? S?(P?)× [0? 1] (14)
is a homotopy (and in particular, a contraction of S?(P?) to ?1). Here ? ? L?? is ?xed,
??(·) is the indicator function of set ?? and ?1(·) is any ?xed selection in S?(P?).
It su?ces to show that ??(·? ·) is ???×|·|-???-continuous. Let {(??(·)? ??)}? be such a
sequence such that
??(·) ???? ?
?
(·) and ?? ??? ?
??
We must show that
??(??(·)? ??) ???? ??(?
?
(·)? ??) ? ?(?).
It su?ces to show that for all ? ? L1?? with k?k1 ? 1,
? =
R
?
?¡
?1????? (?)? ?1????? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)
+
R
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?) ?? 0?
Rewriting, expression ?, we have
? =
Z
?
?¡
?1????? (?)? ?1????? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)| {z }
(?)
+
Z
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?
?
???\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)| {z }
(?)
+
Z
?
?¡
?????\??? (?)? ?
?
???\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)?| {z }
(?)
Because ?? ??
??
??, we haveR
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)
+
R
? h(??? ???? (?)? ??????? (?)) ? ?(?)i ??(?)
=
R
? h(??? ? ???) ? ?(?)i ??(?) ?? 0?
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Thus, (?) ?? 0. Given that ?? = [???? ] for all ?, we note that each of the expressions
(?) and (?) is less than or equal to 2? k?k1 ?(??? M ???), and given that k?k1 ? 1, we
have (?) + (?) ? 4??(??? M ???). We have, then,R
?
?¡
?1????? (?)? ?1????? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)
+
R
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)
? 4??(??? M ???) +
R
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)?
and as ? goes to in?nity
4??(??? M ???)
+
R
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?) ?? 0.
Thus, the ???×|·|-???-continuous function given in (14) for each ? ? L?? , together with
the properties of the Liapunov system (13) specify a homotopy for the set of measurable
selections, S?(P?) - and thus for each ?, S?(P?) is contractible. Q.E.D.
Our proof that S?(P?) is contractible for each ? is a modi?ed version of the proof given
by Mariconda (1992) showing that if the underlying probability space is nonatomic then
any decomposable subset of ?-valued, Bochner integrable functions in L1? is contractible
(where ? is a Banach space). In Mariconda’s result, the space of functions is equipped
with the norm in L1?, while here our space of functions (with each function taking values
in ? ? ??) is equipped with the metric, ??? , a metric compatible with the ?? topology.
We close this subsection with two results: First, we show that because the Nash payo?
selection correspondence, S?(P(·)), is a contractibly-valued (a consequence of S?(P(·))
being a ?-correspondence and the probability space being nonatomic), the ??-??-USCO,
S?(P(·)), is ??-??-approximable. Second, we show that because S?(P(·)), is ??-??-
approximable, it has ?xed points.
Theorem 6 (If S?(P(·)) is a ? correspondence and ? nonatomic, then S?(P(·)) is
??-??-approximable)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] with Nash payo? selection
correspondence S?(P(·)). If S?(P(·)) is a ?-correspondence, and if the dominating
probability measure, ?, is nonatomic, then S?(P(·)) is a ??-??-approximable?
PROOF: By Corollary 5.6 in Gorniewicz, Granas, and Kryszewski (1991), because
the sub-USCO, S?(P(·)), is de?ned on the ANR (absolute neighborhood retract) the
space of value functions L?? taking nonempty, compact, and contractible values in L??
(and hence?-proximally connected values - see Theorem 5.3 in Gorniewicz, Granas, and
Kryszewski, 1991), the ??-??-USCO, S?(P(·)), is a ? mapping. Therefore, by Theorem
5.12 in Gorniewicz, Granas, and Kryszewski (1991), S?(P(·)) is ??-??-approximable.
Q.E.D.
We can now state our main ?xed point result.
Theorem 7 (Fixed points for ??-??-approximable Nash payo? selection
correspondences)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] with Nash payo? selection
correspondence S?(P(·)). If S?(P(·)) is a ?-correspondence, and if the dominating
probability measure, ?, is nonatomic, then S?(P(·)) has a ?xed point (i.e., there exists
?? ? L?? such that ?? ? S?(P??)).
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PROOF: By Theorem 6 above, S?(P(·)) is ??-??-approximable. Therefore, we have
for each ?, a ??-??-continuous function,
??(·) : L?? ?? L?? ?
such that for each (??? ??(·)) ? ???? ? L?? × L?? (i.e., for each (??? ??(·)) ? L?? × L?? ,
with ??(·) = ??(??) ? L?? ) there exists
(??? ??(·)) ? ??S?(P(·)) ? L?? ×L??
(i.e., there exists ??(·) ? ??S?(P??)) such that
???(??? ??) + ???(??(·)? ?
?
(·)) ?
1
?2 . (15)
Equivalently, for any positive integer, ?,
???? ? ???×??( 1?2 ???S?(P(·))).
Thus, the graph of the continuous function ?? : L?? ?? L?? is contained in the ???×??-
open ball of radius 1?2 about the graph of S?(P(·)).
Because each of the functions, ??, is ??-??-continuous and de?ned on the ??-compact
and convex subset, L?? , in L??? , taking values in L?? , it follows from the ?xed point
theorem of Schauder (see Aliprantis and Border, 2006), that each ?? has a ?xed point,
?? ? L?? (i.e., for each ? there exists some ?? ? L?? such that ?? = ??(??))? Let {??}? be
a ?xed point sequence corresponding to the sequence of ??-??-continuous approximating
functions, {??(·)}?. Expression (15) can now be rewritten as follows: for each ?? in the
?xed point sequence, there is a corresponding pair, (??? ??(·)) ? ??S?(P(·)), such that
???(??? ??) + ???(??(??)? ?
?
(·)) ? 1?2 ,
and therefore such that
???(??? ??)| {z }
?
+ ???(??? ?
?
(·))| {z }
?
? 1?2 . (16)
By the ??-compactness of L?? , we can assume WLOG that the ?xed point sequence,
{??}? ? L?? , ??-converges to a limit ?? ? L?? . Thus, by part A of (16), as ? ?? ? we
have
?? ??
??
?? and ?? ??
??
???
and therefore by part B of (16), as ? ??? we have
?? ??
??
??.
Because ??S?(P(·)) is ???×??-closed in L?? ×L?? ,
{(??? ??(·))}? ? ??S?(P(·)),
and ?? ??
??
?? and ??(·) ???? ?
? imply that
(??? ??) ? ??S?(P(·)).
Therefore, ?? ? S?(P??). Q.E.D.
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Given assumptions [DSG-1] it follows from Theorem 1 (Blackwell’s Theorem) and The-
orem 7 above that all ?-class nonatomic discounted stochastic games (including noisy
DSGs and nonatomic DSGs satisfying the coarser transition kernel condition) have sta-
tionary Markov equilibria.
If the graph of the Nash payo? selection correspondence, ??S?(P(·)), contains a ?-
closed subset , ? ? L?? ×L?? whose domain is all of L?? (i.e., ????L?? (?) = L?? ), then
? ?? ?(?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : (?? ?(·)) ? ?
ª
is a ??-??-sub-USCO belonging to S?(P(·)), and moreover, if the dominating probability
measure, ?, is nonatomic, then ?(?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : (?? ?(·)) ? ?
ª
is contractible.
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Part III
The Measurable Selection Problem
for Nash Payo? Correspondences
The second solution we will present for the problem of existence of stationary Markov
equilibria in discounted stochastic games will take the form of a new selection theorem
for the nonconvex, ??-valued Nash payo? correspondence. As we have seen, this corre-
spondence is gotten by composing players’ Caratheodory payo? functions with the upper
Caratheodory Nash equilibrium correspondence.
The USCO part of the Nash correspondence, N (·? ·), is given by
N???? := {N (?? ·) ? U??-? : ? ? ?} .
Under assumptions [A-1], we will show that if in each state ? the USCO part of N (·? ·)
contains an approximable sub-USCO, ?(?? ·) - for example, if for each ? the sub-USCO,
? ?? ??(?) := ?(?? ?),
is ??-valued (for example, convex valued, or more generally, contractibly valued) - then
there exists ?? ? L?? , such that
??(?) = P(?? ??) a.e. [?],
implying that
?? ? S?(P??)?
It is interesting to note that if for each ?, ??(·) is a minimal USCO belonging to N?(·),
then ??(?) is single valued - and hence contractibly valued - for ? is a ??-dense subset of
the parameter space, L?? . Thus, if on the ??-meager subset of L?? where ??(·) is multi-
valued, ??(·) takes connected, locally connected, and hereditarily unicoherent values, then
??(·) will be contractibly valued for all ? ? L?? . Page (2013) has shown, under the same
assumptions on the primitives as those made here, that if in addition, in each state ?
the parameterized collection, {?(?? ·? ?) : ? ? L?? }, is uniformly equicontinuous, then all
minimal USCOs belonging to the USCO part of N (·? ·) are essentially-valued (in the sense
of Fort, 1950) as well as connected-valued. Thus, save for a meager set, under assumptions
[A-1] and the uniform equicontinuity of
{?(?? ·? ?) : ? ? L?? }
for each ?, P(·? ·) := ?(·?N (·? ·)? ?·) is by its very nature close to having an induced
selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P?) := S?(?(·?N (·? ?)? ?)),
possessed of ?xed points.
7 Approximable Nash Correspondences
Let U??-? := U(L?? ? ???? (?)) denote the collection of all upper semicontinuous corre-
spondences taking nonempty, ??-closed (and hence ??-compact) values in ?. Following
the literature, we will call such mappings, USCOs (see Crannell, Franz, and LeMasurier,
26
2005, Anguelov and Kalenda, 2009, and Hola and Holy, 2009). Given any A ? U??-?,
denote by U??-?[A] the collection of all sub-USCOs belonging to A, that is, all USCOs
? ? U??-? whose graph,
??? := {(?? ?) ? L?? ×? : ? ? ?(?)} ,
is contained in the graph of A,
??A := {(?? ?) ? L?? ×? : ? ? A(?)} .
We will call any sub-USCO, ? ? U??-?[A] a minimal USCO belonging to A, if for any
other sub-USCO, ? ? U??-?[A], ??? ? ??? implies that ??? = ??? (see Drewnowski
and Labuda, 1990). We will denote by [A] the collection of all minimal USCOs belonging
to A.
We begin with a formal de?nition of approximable.
De?nition 3 (Approximable Upper Caratheodory Nash Correspondences):
We say that the upper Caratheodory Nash correspondence, N (·? ·), is approximable if the
USCO part,
N???? := {N (?? ·) ? U??-? : ? ? ?} ,
is such that in each state ? there is a sub-USCO,
?(?? ·) ? U??-?[N (?? ·)],
such that for any ? ? 0, there exists a ??-?-continuous function,
???(·) : L?? ?? ?,
having the property that for each (?? ???(?)) ? L?? ×? there exists (?? ?) ? ???(?? ·)
such that
???(?? ?) + ???(???(?)? ?) ? ?,
or equivalently, such that for any ? ? 0, there exists a ??-?-continuous function,
???(·) : L?? ?? ?, having the property that
????? ? ????×?(?????(?? ·)),
where ????×?(?????(?? ·)) is ???×?-open enlargement of ???(?? ·) consisting of those
points, (?? ?), in L?? ×? at less than ? distance from ???(?? ·).
A function ?? : ?× L?? ?? ? is Caratheodory if it is (??? ??)-measurable in ? for
each ? and ??-?-continuous in ? for each ?.
De?nition 4 (Caratheodory Approximable Upper Caratheodory Correspondences):
We say that an upper Caratheodory correspondence, N (·? ·), is Caratheodory
approximable if for any ? ? 0, there exists a Caratheodory function,
?? : ?× L?? ?? ?,
having the property that for each (?? ?) ? ?×L?? and each (?? ??(?? ?)) ? L?? ×? there
exists (?? ?) ? ??N (?? ·) such that
???(?? ?) + ??(??(?? ?)? ?) ? ?,
or equivalently, such that for any ? ? 0, there exists a Caratheodory function,
?? : ?×L?? ?? ?, having the property that for each ?
????(?? ·) ? ????×?(????N (?? ·)).
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The following result on Caratheodory approximable upper Caratheodory correspon-
dences (specialized to our game-theoretic model) is due to Kucia and Nowak (2000, The-
orem 4.2).
Theorem 8 (Approximable implies Caratheodory approximable):
Suppose assumptions [A-1](1)-(7) hold. If the upper Caratheodory correspondence,
N (·? ·), is approximable, then N (·? ·) is Caratheodory approximable.
7.1 A Selection Theorem for Approximable Nash Correspondences
In this section, we will show that if the upper Caratheodory correspondence, N (·? ·),
is approximable, then its induced measurable-selection-valued correspondence, ??(P(·)),
has ?xed points. We begin with our main selection result.
Theorem 9 (A selection result for approximable upper Caratheodory correspondences)
Suppose assumptions [DSG-1] hold and let,
(?? ?) ?? P(?? ?) := {? ? ? : ? = ?(?? ?? ?) for some ? ? N (?? ?)} ,
be the upper Caratheodory Nash payo? correspondence. If N (·? ·) is approximable, then
there exists ?? ? L?? such that
??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?].
PROOF: Because N (·? ·) is approximable, it is Caratheodory approximable. Thus, for
each ?, there exists a Caratheodory 1?2 -approximation,
??(·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?,
of N (·? ·). Consider the sequence of functions,
? ?? ??? (·) := ?(·? ??(·? ?)? ?) ? L?? . (17)
Observe that for each ?, ??(·)(·) is a function from L?? into L?? . Moreover, note that for
each ? the function ??(·)(·) is ??-??-continuous (i.e., ?? ????? ?
? implies that ????(·) ????
????(·)). This is true because for each ?? ?? ????? ?
? implies that for each ? ? ?, as ? ???,
??(?? ??) ??
??
??(?? ??) ? ?, and therefore for each ? ? ?,
?(?? ??(?? ??)? ??) ??
??
?(?? ??(?? ??)? ??),
implying that
?(·? ??(·? ??)? ??) ??
??
?(·? ??(·? ??)? ??) ? L?? .
By the Schauder-Tychono? Fixed Point Theorem (e.g., see Aliprantis-Border, 2006),
for each ?, there exists ?? ? L?? such that
??(·) = ?(·? ??(·? ??)? ??). (18)
Thus, we have for each ? a set, ??, of ?-measure zero such that
??(?) = ?(?? ??(?? ??)? ??) for all ? ? ?\??, ?(??) = 0? (19)
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Call the equation (19), one for each ?, the Caratheodory equation and call the sequence,
{??}?, in L?? the Caratheodory ?xed point sequence and let ?? := ???? - so that,
?(??) = 0?
For each ?xed point and Caratheodory approximating function pair, (??? ??(·? ??)),
consider the measurable function,
? ?? min(???)???N?(·)[???(??? ?) + ??(??(?? ??)? ?)]. (20)
The graph correspondence,
? ?? ??N?(·)?
is measurable (by Kucia-Nowak, 2000) and compact-valued, and therefore, by the conti-
nuity of the function
(?? ?) ?? [???(??? ?) + ??(??(?? ??)? ?)]
on L?? ×?, there exists for each ?, a measurable selection of ??N(·)(·),
? ?? (???? ???) ? L?? ×?
solving the minimization problem (20) state by state (see Himmelberg, Parthasarathy,
Raghavan, and Van Vleck, 1976). Thus, for the measurable function, ? ?? (???? ???), we
have
? ?? (???? ???) ? ??N?(·) for all ? ? ?
(i.e., ??? ? N (?? ???) ?? ? ?)?
?
?
? (21)
and
[???(??? ???) + ??(??(?? ??)? ???)] = min(???)???N?(·)[???(??? ?) + ??(??(?? ??)? ?)]?
so by Theorem 8 above (i.e., the Kucia-Nowak result), we know that
???(??? ???)| {z }
?
+ ??(??(?? ??)? ???)| {z }
?
? 1?2 for all ? ? ?. (22)
Next, let ? ?? (???? ???) be a measurable selection from the correspondence
? ?? ????×?? {(???? ???)}?
Because the Nash equilibrium correspondence, (?? ?) ?? N (?? ?), has a closed graph,
??? ? N (?? ???) for all ? ? ?.
Because ?? ??
??
??, we have by part A of (22) that
??? ???? ?
? ? L?? for all ? ? ?,
and by (19), part B of (22) and the continuity properties of ?(?? ·? ·) we have that,
??(?) = ?(?? ???? ??) a.e. [?].
where (???? ??) ? ????×??{(???? ???)} for all ?. Finally, because
??? ? N (?? ??) for all ??
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we have for any measurable selection, (??(·)? ??), from
? ?? ????×??{(???? ???)}
that
??(?) = ?(?? ???? ??) ? P(?? ??) for all ? ? ?\??, ?(??) = 0?
Q.E.D.
An immediate Corollary of Theorem 9 is the following ?xed point result.
Corollary to Theorem 9 (Fixed points for Nash payo? selection correspondences
induced from approximable Nash correspondences)
Suppose assumptions [DSG-1] hold and let
(?? ?) ?? P(?? ?) := {? ? ? : ? = ?(?? ?? ?) for some ? ? N (?? ?)} := ?(??N (?? ?)? ?)
be an upper Caratheodory Nash payo? correspondence. If the Nash correspondence,
N (·? ·), is approximable, then there exists ?? ? L?? such that
? ?? S?(P?)
has ?xed points (i.e., there exists ?? ? L?? such that ?? ? S?(???)).
PROOF: By Theorem 9, there exists ?? ? L?? such that
??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?].
Therefore,
?? ? S?(P??).
Q.E.D.
Given assumptions [DSG-1] it follows from Theorem 1 (Blackwell’s Theorem) and The-
orem 9 above that all approximable discounted stochastic games have stationary Markov
equilibria.
7.2 Conditions Su?cient for a ??? to be Approximable
We will agree that a discounted stochastic game is approximable if the underlying pa-
rameterized one-shot game,
{G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? ?
satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] has Nash correspondence,
N (·? ·) ? UC??-??
which possesses for each ? a sub-USCO,
?(?? ·) ? U??-?[N (?? ·)],
that is ??-?-approximable. Recall that a sub-USCO, ?(?? ·), is ??-?-approximable if for
each ? ? ? and for each ? ? 0, there exists a ??-?-continuous function, ??? : L?? ?? ?,
such that for each (?? ???(?)) ? L?? ×? there exists (?? ?) ? ???(?? ·) such that
???(?? ?) + ??(???(?)? ?) ? ?.
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Our objective in this section is to identify conditions su?cient to guarantee that the
Nash correspondence, N (·? ·), has an USCO part,
{N?(·) : ? ? ?} ? U??-?,
such that for each ?, there exists some ??-?-approximable sub-USCO,
?(?? ·) ? U??-?[N?(·)].
Before we state our main results, recall the following facts from metric topology (see
the Appendix 3 for a more complete summary): A space ? is ?? provided there is a
sequence of ?? spaces, {??}?, such that ??+1 ? ?? for all ? with ? = ???=1??.18
Also recall from Gorniewicz, Granas, and Kryszewski (1991) that an USCO taking ?-
proximally connected values is called a ?-mapping. For example, if ?(?? ·) ? U??-?[N?(·)]
is such that for each ? ? L?? , ?(?? ?) is ??-valued (and hence ?-proximally connected
valued) then ?(?? ·), is a ?-mapping.
Our main result on approximability gives conditions on the sub-USCOs, ?(?? ·) ?
U??-?[N?(·)], su?cient to guarantee ??-?-approximability.
Theorem 10 (Su?cient conditions for approximability)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game, ???, satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] and having a Nash
correspondence,
N (·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?? (?),
with USCO part is given by
N???? := {N (?? ·) ? U??-? : ? ? ?} .
If for each ? there exists a sub-USCO ?(?? ·) ? U??-?[N?(·)] with ? ?? ?(?? ?) taking
?? values in ?(?), then DSG is approximable.
PROOF: Let ?(?? ·) ? U??-?[N?(·)], and for each ?, consider the the Nash payo? sub-
USCO, ?(?? ·). By Corollary 5.6 in Gorniewicz, Granas, and Kryszewski (1991), because
?(?? ·) is a mapping de?ned on the ANR (absolute neighborhood retract) space of value
functions L?? taking nonempty, compact, ?? values in the ANR space ?(?), the Nash
payo? sub-USCO, ?(?? ·), is ?-proximally connected valued, and therefore a ? mapping.
Thus, by Theorem 5.12 in GGK (1991), ?(?? ·) is ??-?-approximable, and therefore, the
??? is approximable. Q.E.D.
If the Nash USCO, N (?? ·), has at least one sub-USCO, ?(?? ·), taking ?? values in
?(?), then the set of Nash equilibria generating these payo?s cannot be homeomorphic
to a circle - thus, ruling out the Levy-McLennan type of example.
If, for example, a ??? satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] has Nash correspondence,
N (·? ·), such that for each ?, N (?? ·) contains a convex-valued or star-shape valued sub-
USCO, ?(?? ·) - and thus, is ??-valued - then the ??? is approximable. In addition, if
for each ?, N (?? ·) contains a sub-USCO, ?(?? ·), taking arc-like continuum values, arc-
smooth continuum values, or dendritic values, then ?(?? ·) is contractibly-valued - and
thus, is ??-valued (for related results see Cellina, 1969, De Blasi and Myjak, 1986, and
Beer, 1988) - implying that the ??? is approximable.
18If ? is a compact metric space, then ? is ?? provided there is a sequence of contractible spaces,
{??}?, such that
??+1 ? ??
for all ? with
? = ???=1???
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Part IV
Appendices
8 Appendix 1: Mathematical Preliminaries
8.1 A Brief Tour of USCOs
A arbitrary correspondence, ?? is a set-valued mapping,
? : L?? ?? ? (?)?
taking nonempty values. Here ? (?) denotes the collection of nonempty subsets of ?.
The collection of all such mapping is denoted by
FL?? -? := F(L?? ? ? (?))?
We will often restrict attention to closed-valued correspondences,
N (·) : L?? ?? ???? (?)?
de?ned on L?? taking nonempty, ??-closed (and hence ??-compact) values in ?. Here,
???? (?) denotes the collection of nonempty, ??-closed subsets of ?. N (·) is ??-??-upper
semicontinuous if for any ? ? ???? (?)
N?(? ) := {? ? L?? : N (?) ? ? 6= ?} ? ???? (L?? ),
where ???? (L?? ) denotes the collection of nonempty, ??-closed subsets of L?? .19 Following
the literature (e.g., see Crannell, Franz, and LeMasurier, 2005, Hola and Holy, 2009) such
a set-valued mapping is called an USCO. The collection of all such mapping is denoted
by
U??-?? := U(L?? ? ???? (?))?
Denote by ??N the graph of N (·) ? U??-?? given by
??N := {(?? ?) ? L?? ×? : ? ? N (?)} .
An USCO ?(·) ? U??-?? is minimal if ?(·) ? U??-?? and ??? ? ??? implies that
??? = ???. Denote by
M??-?? :=M(L?? ? ???? (?))
the collection of all minimal USCOs. Each USCO contains at least one minimal USCO
(e.g., see Proposition 4.3 in Drewnowski and Labuda, 1990).
An USCO ?(·) ? U??-?? is a sub-USCO belonging to N (·) ? U??-?? if ??? ? ??N .
The collection of all sub-USCOs belonging to N (·) ? U??-?? is denoted by
U??-?? [N (·)]?
Let [N (·)] denote the collection of all minimal USCOs belonging to N (·) ? U??-?? .
Thus,
[N (·)] := {?(·) ?M??-?? : ??? ? ??N} .
19Equivalently, N (·) is ??-??-upper semicontinuous (usc) if given any ??-open subset ? of ?, the set
N+(?) := ?? ? L?? : N (?) ? ?
?
is ??-open in L?? .
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An USCO, N (·) ? U??-?? , such that
[N (·)] = {?(·)} for some ?(·) ?M??-??},
is called a quasi-minimal USCO. Let QM??-?? denote the collection of all quasi-minimal
USCOs. Note that for any N (·) ? U??-?? , each minimal USCO belong to N (·) is quasi-
minimal. Thus,
[N (·)] ? QM??-?? .
Finally, given any USCO N (·) ? U??-?? let
?(N ) := {? ? L?? : N (?) = {?} for some ? ? ?}
denote the set of points in L?? where N (·) is single valued. Because L?? is a compact
metric Baire space and? is metrizable (in this case with metric ???), if N (·) ? QM??-?? ,
then ?(N ) is a dense ?? set in L?? (see Lemma 7 in Anguelov and Kalenda, 2009).
We will denote by
U??-?? := U(L?? ? ???? (L?? ))
the collection of all ??-??-upper semicontinuous correspondences de?ned on L?? taking
values in ???? (L?? ), the hyperspace of nonempty, ??-closed subsets of the ??-compact,
convex subset, L?? , of the separable norm dual, L??? , of the separable Banach space L1?.
8.2 Upper Caratheodory Correspondences, Decomposability, and
Selections
A correspondence, P(·? ·), taking values in ???? (?) is upper Caratheodory on ?×L?? if
it is jointly measurable in ? and ? and upper semicontinuous in ?. We will denote by
UC??-?? := UC(?×L?? ? ???? (?))?
the collection of all upper Caratheodory correspondences de?ned on ? × L?? taking
nonempty ??-closed values in ?.
Each upper Caratheodory correspondence, P(·? ·), has associated with it four other
correspondences which will be of interest to us in solving our ?xed point problem. First,
there is for each ? ? L?? the measurable correspondence,
? ?? P(?? ?) := P?(?),
which takes nonempty, weak?-closed values in ? ? ??. We will sometimes refer to the
induced collection of measurable correspondences,
P(?????? ) := {P(·? ?) ?M??-??? : ? ? L?? } .
as the measurable part of P(·? ·). Second, there is for each ? ? ?, the ??-??-upper
semicontinuous correspondence,
? ?? P(?? ?) := P?(?),
which also takes nonempty, weak?-closed values in ? ? ??. We will sometimes refer to
the induced collection of upper semicontinuous correspondences,
P???? := {P(?? ·) ? U??-?? : ? ? ?} ?
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as the USCO part (or the upper semicontinuous part) of P(·? ·).20 Third, there is the
graph correspondence,
? ?? ??P(?? ·) ? ???-??? (L?? ×?)?
given by
? ?? ??P(?? ·) := {(???) ? L?? ×? : ? ? P(?? ?)} ,
a mapping from the state space into the graphs of the USCO part of P(·? ·). Under
assumptions [A-1], it follows from Lemma 3.1(ii) in Kucia and Nowak (2000) that the
graph correspondence,
? ?? ??P(?? ·) := ??P?(·)?
is (??? ??? ×???)-measurable.
Finally, there is the induced measurable-selection-valued correspondence,
? ?? S?(P(·? ?)) := S?(P?),
with values given by,
S?(P?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?]
ª
.
For each ? ? L?? , S?(P?) is the set of all ?-equivalence classes of functions ?(·) ? L??
such that ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?]. We will refer to the set S?(P?) for each ? ? L?? as the
set of ?-equivalence classes of L?? -measurable, selections of P?(·).
A subset S of L?? is said to be decomposable if for any two functions ?0(·) and ?1(·) in
S and for any ? ? ??, we have
?0(·)??(·) + ?1(·)??\?(·) ? S.
For any upper Caratheodory correspondence, P(·? ·) : ?× L?? ?? ???? (?), we have for
each ? ? L?? , that the induced measurable-selection-valued correspondence, S?(P(·)),
takes decomposable values.
We will denote by ??(P?) the prequotient of S?(P?) (i.e., the set of all a.e. measur-
able selections of P?(·)) and we will denote by ?(P?) the set of all (everywhere) measurable
selections of P?(·).21
9 Appendix 2: ??-Convergence and ?-Convergence
9.1 ??-Convergence in L???
Equip L??? with the weak star topology (i.e., the ??-topology or the ?(L??? ?L1??)-
topology) and denote by ???? the prequotient space of all measurable functions de?ned
20Following the literature (e.g., Hola and Holy, 2009), because the mapping, ? ?? P?(?), takes
nonempty, ??-compact values we will refer to such mappings as USCOs and we will denote the col-
lection of all ??-??-USCOs by
U???? := U(L?? ? ???? (?))?
21Because L?? and S(P?) are spaces of ?-equivalence classes, the notation ?(·) ? L?? or ?(·) ? S(P?)
means [?(·)] ? L?? or [?(·)] ? S(P?), where ?(·) ? ??? or ?(·) ? ?(P?), and
[?(·)] := {? 0(·) ? ??? : ? 0? = ?? a.e. [?]}.
Thus, ?(·) ? S(P?) means that ?(·) ? L?? and for all ? 0(·) ? [?(·)]
? 0? ? P?(?) a.e. [?].
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on ? with values in ??. We have the following de?nitions:
De?nitions A2.1
(1) (Weak Star Convergence in L???) A sequence of ??-valued functions {??}? in
L??? converges weak star, or ??-converges to a function ?? ? L??? if for every function
? ? L1??,
h??? ?i := R? h??(?)? ?(?)i ??(?) ?? R? h??(?)? ?(?)i ??(?) := h??? ?i ? (23)
(2) (Sequential Weak Star Compactness in L???) A subset H of (?-equivalence classes)
of functions in L??? is sequentially weak star compact if every sequence {??}? in H has
a weak star converging subsequence {???}? with limit ?? contained in H?
Note that ??-convergence is with respect to ?-equivalence classes.
9.2 ?-Convergence in ?1??
Consider a sequence {??(·)}? ? ?1?? with corresponding sequence of arithmetic mean
functions,
©
1
?
P?
?=1 ??(·)
ª
?, and for any subsequence, {???(·)}?, of {??(·)}?, let the
corresponding subsequence of arithmetic mean functions be given by(
1
?
?X
?=1
???(·)
)
?
?
Finally, for each ?? let b??(·) := 1?P??=1 ??(·) and for each ?, let b???(·) := 1?P??=1 ???(·).
De?nition A2.2 (?-Sequences, ?-Convergence, and ?-Limits)
We say that a sequence {??}? ? ?1?? is ?-convergent (or is a ?-sequence) if there
exists a ?-limit function b? ? ?1?? such that,
(a) the corresponding sequence of arithmetic mean functions, {b??(·)}?, converges
pointwise a.e. [?] to b?(·), that is,
b??(?) ?? b?(?) a.e. [?],
and
(b) for any subsequence, {???(·)}?, of {??(·)}?, the corresponding subsequence of
arithmetic mean functions, {b???(·)}?, converges pointwise a.e. [?] to b?(·) as well, that
is, b???(?) ?? b?(?) a.e. [?].
We will often refer to set of ?-measure zero where pointwise arithmetic mean conver-
gence fails for a particular subsequence as the subsequence’s exceptional set.
We say that a set of functions, H ? L1?? , is ?-compact if every sequence, {??}? ? H,
has a ?-convergent subsequence with ?-limit contained in H. By Komlos’ Theorem
any k·k1-bounded subset H of L1?? is relatively ?-compact (i.e., has a ?-converging
subsequence with ?-limit contained in L1??).
A sequence, {??(·)}?, of functions in L1?? is norm-bounded provided
sup? k??k1 := sup?
P?
?=1 k??? k1 ??.
For the convenience of the reader we state the Theorem of Komlos (1967) as well as
Page’s (1991) lower closure result.
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Komlos Theorem (1967):
If {??(·)}? ? L1?? is k·k1-bounded, then {??(·)}? has a ?-convergent subsequence.
Page’s Theorem (1991):
If the sequence {??(·)}? ? L1?? is k·k1-bounded and K-converges to some integrable
??-valued function, b?(·), thenb?(?) ? ????{??(?)} a.e. [?]
and there exists an integrable ??-valued function, ??(·), such that ??(?) ? ??{??(?)}
a.e. [?] and Z
?
??(?)??(?) =
Z
?
b?(?)??(?).
9.3 ?-convergence and ??-Convergence in L???
Our next results concern the relationships between ?-convergence and weak star (??-
convergence) in L??? .
Theorem A2.1 (?-Convergence and ??-Convergence):
Suppose the primitives satisfy assumptions [DSG-1]. Let {??}? be any sequence in L??? .
Then the following statements are true:
(1) If {??}? ?-converges to b? ? ????, then {??}? ? L??? ??-converges to b? ? L??? ?
(2) If {??}? ? L??? ??-converges to ?? ? L??? , then each ?-convergent subsequence of
{??}? has a ?-limit, b? ? ???? ? such that b? = ?? a.e. [?]?
Before proceeding to the proof, some comments on notation: In the statement of the
Theorem above, we write {??}? ? L??? , to indicate that rather than viewing the sequence
{??}? as a sequence of speci?c functions - which we will denote by {??}? ? ???? - we
are instead viewing the sequence as a sequence of ?-equivalence classes in L??? indexed
by the speci?c functions, ??. Thus, we write b? ? L??? to denote the ?-equivalence class
in L??? determined by the speci?c function, b?.
PROOF: We will prove part (2) ?rst. Assume that {??}? ? L??? ??-converges to
?? ? L??? , and that the subsequence, {???}?, ?-converges to b? ? ???? . For each ? and
each ? ? ?1?? we have
1
?
?X
?=1
???(?)?(?) ?? b?(?)?(?) a.e. [?]
and by the Dominated Convergence Theorem also in L1??-norm. Thus, for each ? ? ?1?? ,R
? b?(?)?(?)??(?)
:= lim????
1
?
?X
?=1
R
? ?
??(?)?(?)??(?)
=
R
? ?
?(?)?(?)??(?)?
and hence b?(?) = ??(?) a.e. [?].
Now we will prove part (1). Assume that {??}? ? ???? ?-converges to some b? ? ???? .
In order to show that {??}? ??-converges to b?, by ??-compactness and metrizability, it
su?ces to show that the ?-equivalence class in L??? containing b? is the only limit point of
the sequence of ?-equivalence classes, {??}? ? L??? . Let ?? be any ??-limit point of the
sequence {??}? and let {???}? be a subsequence ??-converging to ??. By K-convergence
we know that this subsequence also K-converges to b? and hence by part (2) we know that
?? = b? a.e. [?]. Q.E.D.
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9.4 ??-Compactness and Metrizability of L?? for the ?? Topology
We are now in a position to prove our preliminary result on the ??-compactness and
metrizability of L?? . By Theorem V.1 in Castaing and Valadier (1977) (also see, Theorem
7.14 in Kahn, 1985), the space L?? of all equivalence classes of (??? ???)-measurable
functions taking values in ? a.e. [?] is a ??-compact subset of L??? .
Theorem A2.2 (Metrizability of L?? )
The convex set L?? of all equivalence classes of (??? ???)-measurable functions taking
values in ? a.e. [?] is compact and metrizable for the weak star topology.
PROOF: By Theorem 6.30 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), it su?ces to show that (the
quotient) L1? is (norm) separable. Recall (i) that the ?-?eld, ??, is countably generated
and (ii) that ?? is separable. Hence, let {??}??=1 be the countable collection of subsets
of ? generating ?(?), and let {??}??=1 be a countable dense subset of ??. Note that
the set of vectors {??}??=1 in ?? separates the vectors in ?? (i.e., for ? and ?0 in ??,
h?? ??i = h?0? ??i for all ? implies that ? = ?0), and for each ? and ? de?ne ???(·) ? ?1??
as follows: ???(?) := ????? (?) where ??? (·) is the indicator function for the set ?? . For
? ? ???? ? let h?? ???i be given by
h?? ???i :=
R
? h?(?)? ???(?)i ??(?) =
R
?
?
?(?)? ????? (?)
®
??(?).
Finally, observe that the set of functions {??? : ? and ? in N} ? ?1?? is (norm) dense in
L1?? and separates the functions in ???? , i.e., if
h?? ???i = h?0? ???i for all ? and ?, then ?(?) = ?0(?) a.e. [?]?
Because L?? is k·k?-bounded, given the separability of L1?? by Theorem 6.30 in Alipran-
tis and Border (2006) L?? ? L??? is metrizable for the ??-topology in L??? (i.e., the
?(L??? ?L1??) topology). Thus, L?? is ??-compact and metrizable for the relative ??-
topology inherited from L??? . QED
To ?x the notation, let ??? be a metric compatible with the relative ??-topology (the
?(L??? ?L1??) topology) on L?? and let ?? a metric on ? ? ??.
10 Appendix 3: Continuity of Payo? Functions
Theorem A3.1 (Continuity of Payo? Functions):
Let DSG be a discounted stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] with players’
payo? pro?le function,
(?? ?) ?? ?(?? ?? ?) := (?1(?? ?? ?1)? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??)).
If {(??? ??)}? is a sequence in L?? ×? such that ?? ???? ?
? and ?? ??
??
??, then in
each state ? ? ?,
?(?? ??? ??) ??
??
?(?? ??? ??).
PROOF: Let {(??? ??)}? be a sequence such that ?? ???? ?
? and ?? ??
??
??. Let ? be
given and ?xed, and observe that for each players ?:
|??(?? ??? ??? )? ??(?? ??? ???)|?
? |??(?? ??? ??? )? ??(?? ??? ??? )|?| {z }
??
+ |??(?? ??? ??? )? ??(?? ??? ???)|?| {z }
??
?
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We will carry out our proof for one player ?, keeping in mind that the argument holds
for all players simultaneously. Consider ?? ?rst. We have
?? = ??
¯¯¯¯Z
?
??? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)?
Z
?
???(?0)?(?0|?? ??)
¯¯¯¯
?
?
Let ?(·|?? ??) be a density of ?(·|?? ??) with respect to ?. Given that ??? ?????
???, we have,R
? ?
?
? (?0)?(?0|?? ??) =
R
? ?
?
? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)??(?0)
??
R
? ?
?
?(?0)?(?0|?? ??)??(?0) =
R
? ?
?
?(?0)?(?0|?? ??)?
Thus, ?? ??? 0.
Next, consider ??. We have
?? ? (1? ??)|??(?? ??)? ??(?? ??)|?| {z }
??1
+??
¯¯¯¯Z
?
??? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)?
Z
?
??? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)
¯¯¯¯
?| {z }
??2
?
Continuity of ??(?? ·) and ?? ???? ?
? imply that ??1
??? 0. To see that ??2
??? 0, observe
that ¯¯R
? ?
?
? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)?
R
? ?
?
? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)
¯¯
?? k?(·|?? ??)? ?(·|?? ??)k? ??? 0? Q.E.D.
11 Appendix 4: Metric Topology
11.1 Basics
Throughout assume that (?? ??) and (?? ??) are compact metric spaces.22 Because the
space ? is compact, for any collection {??}? of open sets in ? where ? = ???? and
? ranges over an arbitrary set ?, there exists a ?nite subcollection, ?1? ? ? ? ? ?? such that
? = ??1 ? · · · ???? (i.e., the Borel-Lebesgue condition - every open cover of ? contains
a ?nite subcover). The Borel-Lebesgue condition is equivalent to the Riesz condition:
if {??}? is a collection of closed sets in ? such that ???? = ?, then there is a ?nite
subcollection, ?1? ? ? ? ? ?? such that ??1 ? · · · ? ??? = ? (see Kuratowski, 1972).
Let C(???) denote the collection of continuous functions de?ned on ? taking values
in ?. If ? ? C(???) is one-to-one, from ? onto ?, and if its inverse, ??1, is also
continuous, then we say that ? is a homeomorphism and that the metric spaces ? and
? are homeomorphic. If (?? ??) is compact, then any continuous, one-to-one mapping
? from ? onto ? is a homeomorphism. A function, ? : ? ?? ? is an embedding if
? : ? ?? ?(?) is a homeomorphism. In this case we can think of ? as a topological
subspace of ? by identifying ? with its image ?(?)?
22More detail on the topics covered in this Appendix can be found in Willard (1970) and Illanes and
Nadler (1999).
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11.2 Continua
Given metric space (?? ??), a set ? ? ? is connected if ? cannot be written as the union
of two disjoint open sets (or two disjoint closed sets). A set ? ? ? is locally connected
at ? ? ? if each neighborhood ?? of ? contains a connected neighborhood ?? of ?. ? is
locally connected if it is locally connected at each ? ? ?.23
If the metric space, (?? ??), is compact and connected it is called a continuum. Given
any continuum, (?? ??), a point ? ? ? is called a cut point of ? if ?\{?} is not connected.
A nonempty closed, connected subset of ? is called a subcontinuum. If in addition, the
continuum, (?? ??), is locally connected it is called a Peano continuum.
A subset, ?, of metric space (?? ??) is called an ?-cell if it is homeomorphic to
?? :=
Q?
?=1[0? 1]? := [0? 1]?. If in particular, ? is homeomorphic to the interval [0? 1] it is
called an arc (i.e., an arc, then, is a 1-cell). An end point of arc ? is either one of the two
points of ? that are the images of the end points of [0? 1] under any homeomorphism of
[0? 1] onto ?. A continuum ? is arcwise connected if any two points, ?1 and ?2, in ? can
be joined by an arc in ? with endpoints ?1 and ?2.
We close this subsection by noting that in any metric space (?? ??) the condition of
being (i) a locally connected continuum (i.e., a Peano continuum) and (ii) the continuous
image of an interval are equivalent (this is the Mazurkiewicz-Moore Theorem - see Ku-
ratowski, 1972). Thus, a Peano continuum (with or without an M-convex metric) is the
continuous image of the unit interval, [0? 1].
11.3 Homotopies
We begin by recalling the notion of a homotopy - a function that essentially provides us
with a way to index a set of continuous functions.
De?nition A4.1 (Homotopies) Let ?(? × [0? 1]??) denote the collection of all
continuous functions, ? : ? × [0? 1] ?? ?, de?ned on ? × [0? 1] taking values in ?. A
function ? ? ?(? × [0? 1]??) is called a homotopy and each homotopy speci?es an index
set of continuous functions,
H?(???) := {?(·? ?) : ? ? [0? 1]} ?
The indexed collection, H?(???), can be thought of as an arc, ??, in the continuum of
continuous functions, C(???), equipped with the sup metric. The continuous functions,
? and ? in C(???) are homotopically related or homotopic, if ? and ? are the endpoints
of an arc ?? whose arc type is identi?ed by some function, ? ? C(? × [0? 1]??), called
a homotopy. In particular, if ?? ? ? C(???) are homotopic, then there is an arc of type
? ? C(?× [0? 1]??) running from continuous function ?(·) = ?(·? 0) to continuous function
?(·) = ?(·? 1). We denote this ?-arc from ? to ? by writing ? ? [? ]? or by writing ? ??? ?
(and if the orientation is in the opposite direction, then we write ? ? [?]? or ?
??? ?).
Constant functions form a special class of homotopy arc end points. Let ?? ? C(???)
23Local connectedness di?ers from connectedness. To see this, note for example that the set ? in ?
given by
? = [0? 1) ? (1? 2]
is locally connected but not connected (because ? is equal to the union of two disjoint, half open intervals).
While the set ? in ?2 given by
? := {(?? 0)? (?? 1
?
) : 0 ? ? ? 1 and ? = ±1?±2? ? ? ?} ? {(0? ?)? (1? ?) : ? ? ?}
is connected but not locally connected (because only the point (0? 0) and (1? 0) in ? possess a collection
of connected neighborhoods). These examples are taken from Willard (1970), Chapter 8.
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denote the constant function (i.e., ??(?) = ? for all ? ? ?). If ? and ?? are homotopic (i.e.,
if ?? ? [? ]?, that is, if ?
??? ?? for some ? ? ?), then ? is said to be inessential. Moreover,
if for some pair of compact metric spaces, (?? ??) and (????), all pairs of functions, ?? ? ?
C(???), are homotopic, then in particular, ?? ?? ? C(???), are homotopic for some ?-arc
and some ? ? ? - and this means that for this pair of compact metric spaces, (?? ??) and
(?? ??), all functions , ? ? C(???), are inessential (i.e., for each ? ? C(???), there is
(?(·? ·)? ?) ? (C(? × [0? 1]??)??), ? ??? ??).
11.4 ??-Spaces and ???-Spaces
A space ? is an absolute retract, denoted ? ? ??, if whenever ? is embedded in some
a metric space, say ?, then the embedded copy, ?(?), of ? in ? - with homeomorphism
? : ? ?? ?(?) ? ?, is a retract of ?. A space ? is an absolute neighborhood retract,
denoted ? ? ???, if whenever ? is embedded in some a metric space, say ?, then the
embedded copy, ?(?), of ? in ? - with homeomorphism ? : ? ?? ?(?) ? ?, is a retract
of some neighborhood of ?(?) in ?.
11.5 Contractible Spaces
If ? ? ?, then ? is contractible in ? if for some homotopy ? ? C(? × [0? 1]??), there is
an ?-arc running from the identity (or inclusion) mapping, ??? ? C(???) to a constant
mapping, ?? ? C(???), for some ? ? ?. Thus, ???(·) = ?(·? 0) where ???(?) = ? for all
? ? ? is the inclusion mapping (i.e., ???(?) = ? = ?(?? 0) for all ? ? ?) and ?(·? 1) is the
constant mapping (i.e., ?(?? 1) = ? for all ? ? ? for some ? ? ?).
We say that ? is contractible if ? is contractible in ?. Note that if ? is contractible,
then for any ? ? ?, ? is contractible in ?. By far the most useful facts related to the
contractibility of continua are the following:
(1) If ? is contractible and ? ? ? is a retraction of ?, then ? is also contractible.
Thus if ? : ? onto?? ?, ? ? C(???) where ?(?) = ? for all ? ? ?, then ? is also contractible.
(2) If ? is contractible, then ? is unicoherent (see Corollary A.12.10 in van Mill, 2001)
- implying that all pairs of functions, ?? ? ? C(???1), are homotopic, for the unit circle,
?1 :=
n
? = (?1? ?2) : (?1)2 + (?2)2 = 1
o
. Thus, if ? is contractible, then all continuous
functions, ? : ? ?? ?1 are inessential and we can conclude that ? contains no simple
closed curves.
11.6 ??-Spaces
A space ? is called an ??-space, denoted ? ? ??, if there exists a sequence of compact,
nonempty AR spaces, {??}? such that
??+1 ? ?? for every ?
and
? = ???=1???
If ? is compact, then we have the following inclusion ordering over the topological prop-
erties of ?:
?? ? contractible ? ??.
Note that if ? is an ?? space, it is an ??? space.
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